Court discretion under Article 226 is influenced by delay; unreasonable delays may bar relief, yet petitions filed within standard limitations need not require explanations.

JUDGMENT :

HARISH TANDON, CJ.

1. The writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant is dismissed by the single Bench solely on the ground of delay and laches. It is expressly indicated in the impugned order that though there is no period of limitation for filing the writ petition before the High Court provided in the Limitation Act yet the Court may refuse to entertain a belated writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. There appears to be a delay of one and half year from the date of an accrual of the cause of action which is also indicated in the impugned order. The single Bench proceeded simpliciter on the basis that there is no explanation offered in the writ petition for such delay which invites dismissal in limine.

2. The counsel for the appellant submits that there was in fact no delay in approaching the Court and, therefore, the single Bench cannot hold that there has been a conscious delay and laches attributable to his conduct in approaching the Court.

3. Mr. Dash, learned Additional Government Advocate submits that there has been a considerable delay which is noticed by the single Bench and there is no fetter on the part of the writ Court in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches, provided the Court finds that there is sufficient explanation offered by the petitioner in the said writ petition.

4. There is no quarrel to the proposition that the delay and laches attributable to the conduct of the person may invite a refusal to entertain such writ petition. It admits no ambiguity that the power enshrined under Article 226 of the Constitution of India upon the High Court is a discretionary one and a person who approaches the Court must satisfy that he was vigilant and careful in asserting his right and his conduct should not be blameworthy. Though the period of limitation is not provided under the Limitation Act in relation to filing of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , but the principles akin to it has its equal application when the High Court may refuse to exercise such discretion vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of delay and laches. Such principles emanating from a common law has been adopted in the Indian judicial parlance and its recognition can be seen from the Three Judge Bench decision of the apex Court in the State of Maharashtra v. Digamber , reported in (1995) 4 SCC 683 in the following:

“19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.

20. Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a person in approaching a court of equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221] thus:

“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, w