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2005 Supreme(P&H) 289

PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
G.S.Singhvi and Viney Mittal JJ.
Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.
Versus
State Of Haryana
Civil Writ Petition No. 15749 of 2004,
Decided On : FEBRUARY 21, 2005

Headnote:

Excise Duty - Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 - Section 39, Section 4 Revision, Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 - Section 34, Section 61, Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898 - Section 4 - The court considered the jurisdiction of the Revisional Authority under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 and the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003. It discussed the distinction between the right of appeal and the power of revision, and the effect of the repeal of the old Act on pending proceedings. The court also examined the applicability of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898 in the context of the repeal of the old Act and the transfer of pending proceedings to the new Act.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, a construction company, filed for a refund under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973. After the repeal of the 1973 Act, the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner issued a notice for revision of the assessment order. The petitioner contested the notice, claiming that the Revisional Authority did not have jurisdiction under the repealed Act. The respondents argued that the Revisional Authority's power continued under the old law and relied on a Division Bench judgment and the provisions of the General Clauses Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the Revisional Authority's power cannot be treated as similar to a right of appeal and that the repeal of the old Act did not affect the pending proceedings transferred to the new Act. It also found that the General Clauses Act did not apply due to a different intention expressed in the new Act.

Issues: The main issue was the jurisdiction of the Revisional Authority under the repealed Act and the new Act, and the applicability of the General Clauses Act in the context of the repeal and transfer of pending proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the distinction between the right of appeal and the power of revision, and the effect of the repeal of the old Act on pending proceedings. It also highlighted the different intention expressed in the new Act, which excluded the application of the General Clauses Act.

Final Decision: The court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the orders passed by the Revisional Authority, holding that the Revisional Authority did not have jurisdiction under the repealed Act. The parties were left to bear their own costs.

Judgment

Viney Mittal, J.

1. In these petitions, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of orders passed by the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Range)-cum-Revisional Authority, Ambala (respondent No. 2).

2. For the sake of convenience, we have taken the facts from C.W.P. No. 15749 of 2004. Petitioner-Hindustan Construction Company Limited, Yamuna Nagar (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner-company) is engaged in the business of construction and claims to have its area of operation across the entire country. In the State of Haryana, it is duly registered as a dealer under the provision of Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 1973 Act) and under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act) and is being assessed by Assessing Authority, Yamuna Nagar. For the assessment year 1998-99, the petitioner-Company had returned a gross turnover of Rs. 20,65,04,077/-. as per the return, tax liability of the petitioner-Company was Rs. 40,89,786/-. However, by taking into account the fact that it had already paid tax amounting to Rs. 1,26,01,520/- which was deducted at source by the contractors, it filed application for refund of Rs. 81,11,734/-. Return filed by the petitioner-Company accepted by the Assessing Authority vide order Annexure P1 and refund granted in terms of the prayer made. After more than four years of the finalisation of the assessment, respondent No. 2 issued notice dated 7.6.2004 (Annexure P2) to the petitioner-Company to show cause against the proposed refund of the order on the following grounds:-

"(a) You have filed wrong returns & the assessment has been framed wrongly by taking only the cost price of the material used in the works contract for the purpose of assessment. The returns & the assessment should have been framed accordingly to the law laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Cannon Dunkerley & Company and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan etc., (C.A. No. 4861-4864 of 1992) reported in (1993)88 S.T.C. 204 (S.C.). As per this judgment the value of the goods involved in the works contract will have to be determined by taking into account the value of the entire works contract and deducting therefrom the charges towards labour and service.

(b) A refund has wrongly been allowed as tax paid on cement as there was no manufacturing. This should have been allowed as tax paid sales under Rule 24(i).

(c) The duty draw back of Rs. 17446674/- or amount of Excise duty has been wrongly reduced from the turnover as any incentive/subsidy allowed by the government is not deductible."

3. The petitioner-Company contested the notice issued by respondent No. 2. In the reply filed on its behalf, it was pleaded that after the repeal of the 1973 Act by the Haryana Value Added Tax, 2003 (for short, the VAT Act), respondent No. 2 did not have jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under the old Act. It was claimed that no proceedings were pending or deemed to be pending on 1.4.2003 i.e. the date of commencement of the VAT Act and, therefore, no action could be taken under the repealed Act. It was also pleaded that notice issued for refund of the assessment order was barred by limitation. On merits, it was pleaded that while filing the aforesaid return, it had claimed deductions on account of duty draw, back received from the Government of India, as per Export Import Policy. It is further pleaded that the aforesaid deduction was in respect of excise duty amount paid by the manufacturer on cement and steel from whom petitioner-Company had purchased the goods, which were used in the execution of the project (permanently transferred in works). It is further pleaded that the excise duty on cement and steel was reimbursed as the project executed by the petitioner-Company was funded by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and supplies to such projects are to be regarded as "deemed export" eligible for the aforesaid benefits. It is also c


























































































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