Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, does not apply to a case where a Hindu female had sold the property before the Act came into force and parted with its possession at the time of the sale.

S.S.Dulat, J.

1. Rama Nand was the last male-holder of the property in dispute who died leaving behind two widows, Mst. Jamni and Mst. Manglan, who succeeded to the entire estate of Rama Nand, including the property in dispute. After the demise of Mst. Jamni, the whole estate was held by Mst. Manglan, the surviving widow. Mst. Rajo daughter of Rama Nand inherited the entire property on the demise of Mst. Manglan. On 10th of November, 1943, Mst. Rajo sold certain agricultural land, described in clauses (Alif) of paragraph 1 of the plaint, to Amar Singh defendant No. 1 purporting to be for a consideration of Rs. 3,000.00 . On 26th of June, 1945, she transferred certain other property, described in clauses (Be) and (Dal) of paragraph 1 of the plaint to Sant Lal defendant No. 2. Still later, on 6th of September, 1946, she transferred by way of sale, property described in clause (Jim) to defendants 3 to 9 for a sum of Rs. 8,000.00 . Sewa Ram, claiming to be the sisters son of Rama Nand, challenged all these alienations by means of a suit filed on 9th of November, 1948, out of which the present appeal has arisen, and sought a declaration that the aforementioned alienations being without consideration and legal necessity will not affect his reversionary rights after the demise of Mst. Rajo. Mst. Rajo was impleaded as defendant No. 10. The suit was resisted by defendants 1 and 3 to 9 on various grounds as a result of which a number of issues were settled which it is not necessary to give in detail here. The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the gift made in favour of defendant No. 2 was invalid--and this matter is not in dispute now in appeal--and that the remaining two alienations by way of sale were for consideration but not for legal necessity. It was further held that the plaintiff was an heir according to the law governing the parties. As a result of these findings, the declaration prayed for was granted.

2. With regard to the question of legal necessity, we feel that the finding of the Court below is well-based.

(Their Lordships after discussing the evidence in Paras 2-6 proceeded:)

3 On behalf of the appellants it was urged that in view of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, Sewa Ram is not entitled to the decree granted to him by the Court below, and inter alia it was urged as follows:

(1) That though at the time of the alienation Mst. Rajo was a limited owner and, therefore, could convey only a limited title, she has since become a full owner by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, and consequently the vendees title has become perfect, and neither Mst. Rajo nor any of her heirs can successfully challenge the aforesaid alienations;

(2) that even if by virtue of Section 14, the daughter cannot be said to have become an absolute owner of the property in dispute because she cannot be said to be in possession of the same on the date the Act came into force, yet taking into consideration all the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, the reversioners have ceased to exist as a class and the alienations cannot be challenged.

The first point is concluded by a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as Hari Kishen V/s. Hira, (1957) 59 Pun. LR 56: ((S) AIR 1957 Punj 89). Bishan Narain and Chopra JJ. held that Section 14 of the Act could have no applicability to a case in which a female Hindu had sold the property before the Act came into force and parted with its possession at the time of the sale. The other High Courts in India also have taken a similar view and the contrary view taken by the Patna High Court in Ram Ayodhya Missir V/s. Raghunath (S) AIR 1957 Pat. 480 and Mt. Janki Kuer V/s. Chhathu Prasad, (S) AIR 1957 Pat. 674, and Baijnath V/s. Ramautar, AIR 1958 Pat. 227, has since been overruled by a later Full Bench case of the same High Court reported as Harak Singh V/s. Kailash Singh, AIR 1958 Pat. 581.

4. On the second point the learned counsel only urged--

(1) That a female he