The Claims Tribunal is a "Court" for the purposes of the Limitation Act and the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act are applicable to an application for compensation under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Minor applicants are entitled to the benefit of section 6(1) of the Limitation Act.

S.C.Mittal, J.

1. In the accident that occurred on the Yamuna Nagar Road, Jagadhari, Phul Singh died on 24th January, 1968. An application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act for compensation against the Union of India was filed by Chawli Devi, widow of the deceased, Nando, mother of the deceased, and his minor son Raj Kumar and his minor daughters Bala Devi, Naresho and Angrezo on 29th March, 1969. In consequence of the objection raised by the Union of India, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ambala (thereinafter referred to as the "Claims Tribunal") framed the following issues:

(1) Whether the claim application is within time ?

(2) If issue No. 1 is decided against the applicants, whether they were prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time ?

2. The Claims Tribunal decided both the issues against the applicants and dismissed their claim. Feeling dissatisfied, they preferred the present appeal. Admittedly the major applicantsChawli and Nando filed the claim after the expiry of the limitation. Hence on their behalf the defect was conceded.

3. So far as the claim of the minor applicants flamed above is concerned, relief was sought with the aid of section 29(2) read with section 6(1) of the Limitation Act. Relying on Single Bench decision in Harbans Singh v. Atma Singh and others, 1966 A.C.J. 172, the Claims Tribunal held that it was not a Court but persona designata. Therefore, the provisions of section 29(2) did not apply.

4. When this appeal came before me sitting singly, other decisions, discussed hereinafter, of this and other Courts were cited. Upon a consideration of the same, I referred the following questions to a larger Bench:

(1) Has Harbans Singh v. Atma Singh and others, 1966 A.C.J. 172, been impliedly overruled by the Full Bench decision in Smt. Shanti Devi and others v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, 1971 A.CJ. 247 and is the Claims Tribunal a "Court" to attract the provisions of the Limitation Act?

(2) If the Claims Tribunal is not a Court, can by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the benefit of the provisions of the said Act be given to the claimants ?

(3) Is an application filed under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act "suit", within the meaning of section 6 (1) of the Limitation Act ?

(4) If the application aforesaid is not "suit", whether limitation can be extended under proviso to section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act on the ground of minority of the claimants ?

5. With regard to the first question, it deserves mention that Harbans Singhs case (supra) was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Fazilka Dubwali Transport Co. Private Ltd. v. Madan Lal, 1968 ACJ 43, wherein it was held that the cases under the Motor Vehicles Act dealt with awards of special Tribunal in special proceedings and the right of appeal given to Civil Courts is to be strictly construed. Therefore, an appeal under clause X of the Letters Patent is not competent. This question was later decided by a Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Shanti Devi and others v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, 1971 ACJ 247. The learned three Judges constituting the Full Bench held : (1) appeal lies under clause X of the Letters Patent against the decision of a learned Single Judge in appeal filed against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal given under section 110-D of the Act, (2) the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal do not have any semblance with the arbitration proceedings, the word "award" has been used synonymous with the word "decree" and (3) the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal clearly resemble the proceedings in a Civil Court and the Claims Tribunal for all intents and purposes discharges the same functions and duties and in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do. The proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are not in the nature of arbitration proceedings and that the Claims Tribunal while disposing of the claims, acts as a Court. It merits