A restriction on alienation contained in a compromise is void under Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, if it is a derogation from the full proprietary rights conferred upon the transferee.

Kapur, J.

1. This appeal is brought by defendant No. 2 Captain Parmodh Singh against an appellate decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Dharamsala, reversing the decree of the trial Court dismissing the plaintiffs suit with costs.

2. The facts which have given rise to this appeal are that on 4-7-1928 one Gulaba obtained 19 Kanals 10 Marias by a compromise which was arrived at in original suit No. 78 decided on 18-7-1928 in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Dharamsala. This compromise is dated 4-7-1928 and one of its terms was that 19 Kanals 10 marlas was to be given, to Gulaba. The deed of compromise further recites:

"On this land I, the plaintiff (Gulaba) will remain in possession as Malik Kamal Dwami. I shall not be entitled to mortgage or sell the land to anybody else. * * * * * If I, the plaintiff, die without any sons, then the land above referred to 19 kanals 10 marlas will without the payment of any compensation revert to Mehr Singh defendant No. 2."

And a mutation was entered on the basis of this on 9-10-1928. On 14-4-1933 Gulaba gifted 20 kanals 2 marlas of land to his wife, Mst. Panjabo. The area does not seem to be quite correct, and the done in her turn sold the land in dispute to Parmodh Singh defendant No. 2 for Bs. 1,500/- on 23-12-1938. The successors-in-interest of Mehr Singh, who entered into the compromise, brought a suit on 6-5-1944 for declaration that the alienation made by the widow will not affect their right of reversion obtained by them under the deed of compromise The suit was dismissed by the trial Court, but on appeal the learned Judge held that Question No. 54 of Middletons Riwaj-i-am of Kangra District applied and as the plaintiffs fell within the third category of persons entitled to inherit, they were entitled to challenge the sale and gave the declaration in favour of the plaintiffs.

3. In appeal it is contended that the transaction was not a gift at all and that it was really nothing more than a transfer, and reliance is placed on the following words in the deed of compromise:

"The defendants after going home (meaning after going from the Court) will get the ownership transferred in my (the plaintiffs) name in the revenue papers."

But as against this Mr. Nayar has pointed out that in the beginning of the deed it is stated that this land was being given to Gulaba for his maintenance and he also points out that the other terms of this compromise show that if the original plaintiff, Gulaba, had any lineal descendants then they will after the death of Gulaba be entitled to the property and his submission is two-fold (1) that it was given by way of maintenance to Gulaba and his lineal descendants and (2) that there is an express condition of reversion on the line of Gulaba becoming extinct.

4. But I have to interpret the words of the document in their true setting. It appears that there was a case in which Gulaba was the plaintiff and had brought a suit for possession of 213 kanals and it is not shown that Gulaba and Mehr Singh, who was the defendant in that suit, were collaterals. The land may have been given for the purpose of maintenance, but the words of disposition are quite clear in that they gave an absolute estate in perpetuity. The words are:

"Is nar man wuddai bataur malik kamil dorri, qubiz rahega (On this land I, the plaintiff, shall remain in possession as Malik Kamil in perpetuity."

These words have been held to convey an absolute title.

5 In -- Nand Singh V/s. Pratap Das, AIR 1924 Lah 674 (A), there was a compromise in a pending proceeding by which a portion of the property was given to one party and the rest to the other and there was a condition by which one of the parties had agreed that they will be absolutely debarred from making any sort of alienation. Mahant Pratap Das who was the other party to compromise brought a suit for declaration that a mortgage which was created by the other party to the compromise was null and void, but Harrison J, before whom the