The central legal point established in the judgment is that when parties have entered into a compromise in certain types of cases, continuation of the proceedings would be an abuse of process of the Court, justifying the quashing of the FIR.

JUDGMENT

Rajesh Bhardwaj, J. (Oral). - Instant petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying for quashing of FIR No.162 dated 23.9.2017, registered under Sections 406, 498-A IPC, at Police Station Kharar, SAS Nagar Mohali on the basis of compromise dated 14.12.2021 (Annexure P-2).

2. FIR in question was got registered by complainant-respondent No.2 and the investigation commenced thereon. However, with the intervention of respectables, finally the parties arrived at settlement and they resolved their inter se dispute, which is apparent from Compromise Deed, annexed as Annexure P-2. On the basis of the compromise, the petitioners are praying that continuation of these proceedings would be a futile exercise and an abuse of process of the Court and thus, the FIR in question and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom may be quashed in the interest of justice.

3. This Court vide order dated 5.1.2022 directed the parties to appear before the Illaqa/Duty Magistrate for recording their statements, as contended before the Court, and the Illaqa/Duty Magistrate was also directed to send its report.

4. In pursuance to the same, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kharar has sent its report dated 23.2.2022 to this Court. With the report, she has also annexed original statement of complainant-respondent No.2-Aditi Goel recorded on 10.3.2022 and joint statement of the petitioners, namely, Saksham Gupta, Bharat Bhushan and Madhu Gupta recorded on 15.2.2022 and statement of ASI Gurnam Singh recorded on 22.3.2022. On the basis of the statements, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kharar has concluded in its report that the compromise is genuine, voluntarily and out of free will of the parties. It is mentioned in the report that there is no other accused in the present case except the present petitioners. It is further mentioned in the report that neither the accused were declared proclaimed offender nor involved in any other case.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and the report sent by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kharar.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the marriage in question has been dissolved by decree of divorce under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

7. A bare perusal of statutory provision of the 482 Cr.P.C. would show that the High Court may make such orders, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 320 Cr.P.C. is equally relevant for consideration, which prescribes the procedure for compounding of the offences under the Indian Penal Code.

8. Keeping in view the nature of offences allegedly committed and the fact that both the parties have amicably settled their dispute, the continuation of criminal prosecution would be a futile exercise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases including Narinder Singh and others Versus State of Punjab and another, 2014 (6) SCC 466; B.S.Joshi and others vs State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 675 followed by this Court in Full Bench case of Kulwinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR 1052 have dealt with the proposition involved in the present case and settled the law.

9. Thereafter, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs State of Punjab and another (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303 further dealt with the issue and the earlier law settled by the Supreme Court for quashing of the FIR in State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. Para 61 of the judgment reads as under:-

'61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wi