The discretionary power of the court to award interim compensation under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act is based on the facts and circumstances of each case, and dilatory tactics by the accused can justify the passing of such orders.

JUDGMENT

Jasjit Singh Bedi, J. (Oral) - The prayer in the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is for setting aside the order dated 26.07.2022 passed by the Additional Session Judge, Gurugram (Annexure P-2) in a criminal complaint bearing No.NACT/629/2020 dated 08.01.2020 titled as 'M/s Baba Jagta Shuttering Pvt. Ltd. versus Salim Chohan' (Annexure P-3) vide which the order dated 09.05.2022 (Annexure P-4) passed by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Gurugram, allowing an application under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act for paying interim compensation has been affirmed.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the complainant-respondent company is in the business of supplying scaffoldings and shuttering material.

As per the complaint, the complainant-company (respondent No.2) supplied the material to the petitioner-accused company from time to time. In partial discharge of its legal liability, a cheque bearing No.373913 dated 25.10.2019 for a sum of Rs.77,25,000/- was issued by the petitioner-accused company. The said cheque was dishonoured leading to the initiation of proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short 'the Act'), the filing of the complaint and consequent summoning order dated 08.01.2020. The petitioner No.2/accused appeared before the Trial Court on 12.11.2021 and was granted bail on the same date. On that very date, finding a prima facie case, the petitioner No.2-accused was served a notice of accusation for having committed an offence under the Act to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Another application under Section 143-A of the Act praying for interim compensation was moved, which was adjourned for filing a reply. A reply was submitted by the petitioner No.2-accused. It was stated that the grant of interim compensation under Section 143-A of the Act was discretionary in nature depending on the facts and circumstances of each case and since the petitioner No.2-accused had a good case on merits, the compensation ought not to be granted. In fact, the cheque in question, had been given by way of security against the material rented by the accused- petitioners and it was a blank undated cheque, which had been handed over to the complainant-respondent. This fact had been admitted by the complainant-respondent as well and since it was a security cheque as admitted by the complainant-respondent, therefore, it could not be presumed that the cheque was issued towards the discharge of any debt or liability. In fact, the complaint had been filed so that the complainant-respondent could pressurize the petitioners-accused in appropriate civil/criminal actions when initiated by the complainant-respondent. It is also stated in the reply that there were seven previous complaints pending adjudication, all arising from the same transaction between the accused-petitioners and the complainantrespondent and this fact had not been disclosed to the Court. An FIR No.09/2021 dated 18.01.2021 under Sections 406/506/120-B IPC was also registered against the accused at the instance of the complaint-respondent with respect to the same facts, circumstances and transactions, in which the petitioner No.2-accused was granted bail. In fact, the entire scaffolding material rented by the accused-petitioners had been recovered by the complainant-respondent, and therefore, no interim relief of compensation ought to be granted to the complainant/respondent.

After hearing the respective contentions of both the parties, the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Gurugram, vide order dated 09.05.2022 (Annexure P-4) awarded compensation to the extent of 20% of the cheque amount.

3. Against the aforementioned order, a revision petition was preferred before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram. The grounds raised were similar in nature. It was contended that under Section 143-A of the Act, compensation ought to be granted in cases where delay tactics were being adopted by the accused which was not so