IMPORTANT POINT
The discretionary nature of Section 143A of the NI Act, the need for the Trial Court to record reasons for awarding compensation, and the limited scope of interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

JUDGMENT

Jyoti Singh, J. (Oral) - This petition has been filed on behalf of the Petitioner assailing impugned orders dated 18.08.2023 and 11.12.2023 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and learned Additional Sessions Judge, respectively in respect of interim compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- awarded in favour of the Respondent herein being 20% of the amount under the cheque, which was dishonoured on presentation by the Respondent. Respondent is the Complainant and Petitioner herein is the Accused before the learned Trial Court and the parties are hereinafter referred to by their litigating status before this Court.

2. Factual matrix to the extent necessary is that a complaint was filed under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (`NI Act') through Sh. Sumit Gupta, Managing Director, GNG Stock Holding Pvt. Ltd./Respondent herein against the Petitioner Smt. Geeta Monga, in respect of cheque No. 142144 dated 11.03.2020 for Rs.15,00,000/-, issued by the Petitioner in favour of the Respondent and which on presentation with the bank on 12.03.2020 was dishonoured vide memo dated 13.03.2020 with remarks `Exceeds Arrangement'. Petitioner and her husband were informed of the dishonour of the cheque, who kept on assuring that the outstanding debt will be cleared and upon their request, the cheque was again presented on 12.04.2020 but was dishonoured vide memo dated 15.04.2020 with remarks `Funds Insufficient'. Legal notice dated 17.06.2020 was issued by the Respondent calling upon the Petitioner to pay the cheque amount but to no avail and finally, the complaint was filed by the Respondent.

3. As per record, cognizance of the offence was taken under Section 138 of NI Act on 28.03.2022 and notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. was framed on 11.01.2023. Application filed by the Petitioner seeking discharge was dismissed on 20.03.2023, alluding to the decision of the Supreme Court in Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881, Suo Moto Writ Petition Crl. No. 0212020 dated 16.04.2021.

4. Respondent filed an application before the learned M.M. seeking payment of interim compensation by the Petitioner to the tune of 20% of the cheque amount, on the ground that notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. has been framed against her and Petitioner has admitted her signatures on the cheque in question and therefore, presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act arises in favour of the Respondent. It was also urged that Petitioner was adopting delaying tactics to prolong the conclusion of the trial, which was evident from the fact that on multiple occasions, exemption applications were filed by the Petitioner and on one date, adjournment cost of Rs.2,000/- was also imposed by the Court. As per the Respondent, such a conduct warranted exercise of discretion under Section 143A of the NI Act in favour of the Respondent to give some respite to the Respondent Company, which was suffering financial losses for the last several years. By order dated 18.08.2023, the learned M.M., after hearing the parties allowed the application and directed the Petitioner to make payment of 20% of the cheque amount i.e. Rs.3,00,000/- as interim compensation within 60 days. This order was carried in a revision petition being CR No. 626/2023 by the Petitioner, however, the petition was dismissed upholding the order of the learned M.M. Both the orders are assailed before this Court.

5. Arguing on behalf of the Petitioner, learned counsel submits that the impugned orders suffer from an error, inasmuch as the learned Trial Court while holding in paragraph 12 of the order dated 18.08.2023 that the only factor which could come to the rescue of the accused while deciding the present application would be if she could show that she has not been dragging/delaying the proceedings, takes a view that the Petitioner has delayed the proceedings, which is clearly contrary to the Trial Court record as reflected from the various order sheets. It is urged that w