Bhupender Singh vs State of Haryana - 2023 Supreme(P&H) 1749

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2023 Supreme(P&H) 1749

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J.
Bhupender Singh – Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana & Anr. – Respondents
CRM-M No. 23386 of 2023
Decided On : 16-05-2023

Advocates appeared:
For the Parties : Mr. J.P. Sharma, Mr. Ashok Singh Chaudhary AAG, Haryana, Mr. Anil Kumar Sharma

Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 376(2)(n) - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Compromise Claim - Complainant, in a fit of anger, lodged a false FIR alleging rape, which was later retracted upon compromise within 15 days; the court emphasized the gravity of rape as a heinous offence, noting previous judgments which indicate that FIRs for such crimes should not be quashed based merely on compromise - The request for quashing based on subsequent retraction was denied. (Paras 1-5, 10-16)

(B) Jurisdiction and Powers of High Court - The power to quash proceedings does not apply to serious offences involving mental depravity; such matters impact societal interest and should not be resolved by compromise. (Paras 9, 12-13)

(C) Direction for Future Cases - Courts are directed to initiate proceedings under Section 182 IPC for false allegations where the complainant turns hostile. (Paras 15-16)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner faced allegations of rape, which was later claimed by the complainant to have been made in anger and not intended to be pursued, yet the court found the allegations were part of serious criminal concerns.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the compromise was insufficient to justify quashing the FIR due to the serious nature of the offence involved.

Issues: The case addressed the permissibility of quashing FIRs in heinous crimes based on compromise and the broader implications for public interest.

Ratio Decidendi: The decision reinforced the principle that serious offences like rape cannot be simply quashed on the basis of victim's subsequent claims of compromise, prioritizing the public interest over individual disputes.

Result: Petition dismissed.

Table of Content
1. compromise between parties after fir (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4)
2. arguments against quashing fir due to serious nature of allegations (Para 5 , 6)
3. legal principles related to quashing fir based on compromise (Para 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12)
4. judicial considerations for exercising quashing powers (Para 13 , 15)
5. petition for quashing fr rejected (Para 16 , 17)

Judgment

Mr. Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J.

The matter comes up on the joint prayer of both the counsels appearing for the accused-petitioner and the complainant stating that a compromise has taken place amongst them and therefore the FIR and further proceedings be quashed as against the petitioner.

2. It is stated that the complainant and this petitioner wanted to marry but as the marriage could not take place, the complainant in fit of anger and rage lodged an FIR for offence under Section 376 (2)(n) of IPC at Police station Bhondsi, District Gurugram on 08.04.2023. She also got her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C wherein she made allegations of having been raped by the petitioner.

3. Soon thereafter within 15 days or so i.e on 24.04.2023, a compromise was arrived at between the parties after the elders intervened and the complainant stated that she had earlier made allegations in a fit of anger which she wants to withdraw. She also specifically mentioned that no rape or any other offence has been committed.

4. Based on such compromise, the petition has been filed seeking quashing of the FIR.

5. Learned State counsel submits that the process initiated after lodging of an FIR results in the entire police administration taking up the matter with its full vigour. There are already directions issued from time to time by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court for taking up matters relating to rape with vigilance. He, therefore, submits that as the offence alleged is of a heinous and deprevious decadent nature and as held by the Apex Court from time to time, it being an offence involving mental depravity, such FIRs ought not to be quashed by this Court even though compromise has been arrived at between the victim and the accused.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner states that the petitioner ought not be made to face agony of trial moreso as both the parties have decided to live separately and victim after attaining age of majority does not press charges against the petitioner. There is no chance of conviction of the petitioner as even in trial she would not support the allegations made in the FIR.

7. I have considered the submissions.

8. A three judges Bench of Apex Court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Kumar and others versus State of Gujarat and another , (2017) 9 SCC 641 was examining a matter relating to a case registered on the basis of a complaint for offences under Sections 384 , 47, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) IPC. A settlement was arrived at between the parties, however, High Court found that the case involved extortion, forgery and conspiracy and it was not in the interest of society at large to accept the settlement and quash the FIR. Petitioner relied upon judgment passed by the Apex Court Gian Singh versus State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narender Singh versus State of Punjab , (2014) 6 SCC 466 to submit before the Apex Court that the FIR deserves to be quashed in view of the amicable settlement.

9. The Apex Court having noticed a law in Gian Singh’s case (supra) and Narender Singh’s case (supra) and State of Maharashtra versus Vikram Anantrai Doshi , (2014) 15 SCC 29 and CBI versus Maninder Singh , (2016) 1 SCC 389 laid down following broad principles:-

“16.1 Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information r