Judgment

Mr. Arvind Singh Sangwan, J. (Oral):- By way of the present petition, filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner has prayed for quashing of FIR No.61 dated 25.08.2020 under Sections 376 (2)(N) IPC, registered at Women Police Station, District Gurugram and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties.

2. Vide order dated 28.09.2020, the parties were directed to appear before the trial Court and the trial Court was directed to record the statements of the parties and submit a report regarding number of persons arrayed as accused in the FIR; whether any accused is proclaimed offender; whether the compromise is genuine, voluntary and without any coercion or undue influence and whether any accused person is involved in any other FIR. The trial Court was also directed to record the statement of the Investigating Officer as to how many victims/complainants are there in the FIR.

3. A report dated 07.12.2020, has been submitted by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Gurugram, wherein it has been reported that statements of the petitioner and respondent No.2 have been recorded and statements made by the parties in the Court reveal that they have voluntarily entered into a compromise and the Court is satisfied that the parties have amicably settled their dispute without any fear, pressure, threat or coercion and out of their free will.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no other criminal case is pending between the parties and none of the petitioner has been declared as proclaimed offender. Counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment “ Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra ”, 2019(9) SCC 608. The operative part of the said judgment reads as under :-

18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.

19. The allegations in the FIR indicate that in November 2009 the complainant initially refused to engage in sexual relations with the accused, but on the promise of marriage, he established sexual relations. However, the FIR includes a reference to several other allegations that are relevant for the present purpose. They are as follows:

19.1 The complainant and the appellant knew each other since 1998 and were intimate since 2004;

19.2 The complainant and the appellant met regularly, travelled great distances to meet each other, resided in each other’s houses on multiple occasions, engaged in sexual intercourse regularly over a course of five years and on multiple occasions visited the hospital jointly to check whether the complainant was pregnant; and

19.3 The appellant expressed his reservations about marrying the complainant on 31 January 2014. This led to arguments between them. Despite this, the appellant and the complainant continued to engage in sexual intercourse until March 2015.

20. The appellant is a Deputy Commandant in the CRPF while the complainant is an Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax.

21. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise