Termination of services without compliance with statutory provisions under the Industrial Disputes Act is illegal, and the burden of proof lies on the employer to establish a voluntary resignation.

JUDGMENT

Mr. Sanjay Vashisth, J. (Oral)

Petitioner-M/s Creative Edge Men's Wear Pvt. Ltd (Being Management) has filed present writ petition challenging the award dated 09.10.2015(Annexure P-11), passed by learned Labour Court, Panipat, whereby reference No.243 of 2010 under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short 'the Act of 1947'), has been answered in favour of the worklady.

Learned Tribunal has held that termination of the services of the worklady by Management is in violation of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 and the same is illegal and arbitrary. Accordingly, respondent No.2-Smt. Saytawanti (worklady) has been ordered to be reinstated in service with continuity of service alongwith 50 % back wages.

2. Through the demand notice and claim statement, worklady pleaded that she was appointed as Operator on 30.07.2007 with the Management on a monthly salary of Rs. 4,100/-. Her work and conduct was quiet satisfactory. On 01.08.2009, she was not allowed to enter the main gate by the Security Guard and was rather told that she has been retrenched from the services by the Management. It was also told to her that some other person has been engaged at her place. On 18.08.2009, a complaint was filed by the worklady regarding her illegal retrenchment, but no heed was paid to it. Since, the termination is without any notice, pay in lieu of notice, or retrenchment compensation, same was pleaded to be illegal and in violation of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. It was further pleaded that she worked for more than 240 days with the Management in the preceding one year of her termination.

3. On the other hand, pleaded case of the Management before Labour Court was that the worklady was appointed in Company on 07.04.2008 as a worker and was allotted employee Code No.224. She voluntarily resigned from the service and thereon, after receiving full and final dues of Rs. 6,191/- on 30.07.2009 from the Management, she had left the office as no further action was required at the end of the Management.

4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, after framing of the issues, learned Tribunal examined the record and reached to the conclusion that Ex.M6 is the basic document of resignation but, same has not been proved in accordance with law by the Management. In regard to the evidence led by the Management i.e resignation letter, its acceptance and pay voucher, learned Tribunal commented as under:

"11. Ex.M-6 is the resignation letter, relied upon by the respondent in support of its case that she voluntarily resigned from the services. The perusal of this letter shows that the entire letter except the signatures are in one hand little dark, whereas, the signatures of workman are in a lighter ink. The workman may have agreed to her signatures on the resignation but keeping in view the distinction of ink used, there is every force in the arguments advanced by learned Authorized Representative for the work-lady that the signatures of work-lady used to be taken on blank papers.

12. No witness was examined by the respondent, who could state that the letter was written by the work-lady herself. MW-1, in his cross-examination stated that the writing on documents Ex.M1 to Ex.M5 are the same and is written by work-lady. He has further stated that he did not recognize the writing on Ex.M6 i.e. the resignation letter and stated that he could not tell about the writing on Ex.M6 is the worklady or not. He further stated that no witness had signed on resignation letter Ex. M6. He has stated that according to his opinion this letter could have been written by the work-lady or by any other person was written. In this way, he is not a witness to the writing of the letter by the work-lady.

13. On being cross-examined by Ld. AR for the respondent that the work-lady clearly denied the resignation letter which proves that the resignation was against her free will and it was not a true resignation. Therefore, the stand of the respondent that the wor