The court clarified that state policies for premature release must be applied equitably, implicating constitutional guarantees against arbitrary treatment.

JUDGMENT :

Manisha Batra, J. (Oral) -

The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India making prayer for setting aside the order dated 29.11.2023 (Annexure P-4), passed by the respondent No. 1, whereby, the case of the petitioner for premature release, as per the policy dated 12.04.2022 (Annexure P-3) as issued by the Govt. of Haryana, had been deferred for one year with a direction that his case will be re-considered after one year.

2. As submitted in the petition, the petitioner had been held guilty and convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC, vide judgment of conviction dated 01.09.2007 and order on quantum of sentence dated 04.09.2007, passed in case arising out of FIR No. 46 dated 08.04.2006, registered under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC at Police Station Barara, District Ambala and had been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. Admittedly, he had filed an appeal against his conviction, which had been dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court, vide judgment dated 12.09.2012 passed in CRA-D-844-DB-2007.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the petitioner had undergone the actual sentence of more than 14 years and 08 months and 25 days. His case was fully covered under the policy issued by the Govt. of Haryana on 12.04.2022 (Annexure P-3). His case was forwarded by the respondent No. 3-Superintendent, Central Jail, Ambala for premature release in the light of the aforesaid policy, however, instead of releasing the petitioner on premature release, respondent No. 1 had deferred his case for a period of one year by passing the impugned order dated 29.11.2023 (Annexure P-4). It is further submitted that vide orders dated 25.07.2018, convicts Hukmi Devi and Chandi Devi, who were also convicted for life imprisonment in the aforesaid case, had been granted benefit of premature release by respondent No. 1. It is further argued that while passing the impugned order, although respondent No. 1 had observed that the petitioner was entitled for the benefit of premature release in view of policy dated 12.04.2022, however, only on the ground that State Level Committee has observed that the petitioner along with co-accused had committed crime in a cruel, ghastly and barbaric manner, he had deferred the case of the petitioner, while ignoring the fact that aforesaid two convicts, who were convicted in the same case and were awarded the same sentence, had already been granted the said benefit. While submitting that respondent No. 1 had passed the impugned order in an arbitrary manner, it is urged that the petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

4. Per contra, learned State counsel has argued that there is no infirmity in the impugned order passed by respondent No. 1 as the same was based on the recommendation of the State Level Committee, which had considered the parole case of the petitioner under para 2(a)(viii) of the Premature Release Policy dated 12.04.2023 in its meeting held on 25.10.2023 and it was only after due deliberations and keeping in view the manner in which the crime had been committed by the petitioner that his case for premature release was deferred for one year. Therefore, he has urged for dismissal of the present petition.

5. I have heard learned counsel for both the sides and have also gone through the material placed on record carefully.

6. At the outset, it may be mentioned that as per aforesaid policy dated 12.04.2023, a convict can be released prematurely on fulfilling certain conditions and on recommendation of the compe