JUDGMENT :

KULDEEP TIWARI, J. 

1. All these writ petitions are amenable for being decided through a common verdict on account of theirs inhering a common question of law for consideration. For the sake of brevity and convenience, the prayer clause is extracted from CWP-37898-2025.

2. The relief yearned for in this writ petition appertains to quashing of the order dated 01.10.2025, whereby the appeal(s) filed by the petitioner, under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, were dismissed by the respondent No.1- Appellate Authority on the ground of theirs being suffering from the vice of delay.

3. There was delay of more than six months in filing the appeal(s), which the petitioner attributes to having pursued its claim before a wrong forum.

4. The pivotal issue, which emerges for consideration, is “whether the appellate authority is vested with jurisdiction to condone delay in filing the appeal beyond 120 days”. On this issue, a reference to Rule 7(2) of The Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the “Rules of 1997”), which is extracted hereunder, is inevitable:-

“7. Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal.—

XX XX XX

(2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days.

Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless he has deposited with the Tribunal a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing 75% of the amount due from him as determined under Section 7-A.

Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under Section 7-O.”

5. Further, the issue (supra) is no more res integra inasmuch as a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, relying upon the decision in “Bank of Baroda Vs. Union of India and others”, CWP-1121-2025, held in “M/s Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. Vs. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner and others”, CWP-6719-2025, that the appellate authority has no power to condone delay beyond 120 days. The relevant paragraphs of the verdict rendered in CWP-6719-2025 are extracted hereunder:-

“4. The same question of law came up for consideration before this Court while deciding CWP-1121-2025 titled as Bank of Baroda vs. Union of India and others on 17.02.2025 wherein, it has been held that the Appellate Authority does not have the power to condone the delay beyond 120 days.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation has not been able to rebut the said principle of law.

6. Keeping in view the said fact, present petition is also dismissed in terms of CWP-1121-2025 titled as Bank of Baroda vs. Union of India and others, decided on 17.02.2025 keeping in view the findings recorded by this Court.”

6. The verdict (supra) was challenged before a LPA Bench of this Court in LPA-3242-2025, however, the same was upheld vide order dated 13.11.2025.

7. A similar issue has been examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada and others Vs. M/s. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited”, 2020 AIR (SC) 2819. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court read as under:-

“8. From the indisputable facts, it is evident that the assessment order dated 21.6.2017 was challenged by the respondent by way of statutory appeal before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner only on 24.9.2018.

Section 31 of the 2005 Act provides for the statutory remedy against an assessment order. The same, as applicable at the relevant time, reads thus:

“31. (1) Any VAT dealer or TOT dealer or any other dealer objecting to any order passed or procee