The court endorsed a liberal approach to condoning delays in appeals, emphasizing substantial justice over technicality, while holding the State to the same standards as other litigants.

ORDER :

Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.

1. The Petitioner seeks condonation of sixty-six days delay in filing the Petition under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking Leave to Appeal.

2. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor urging this Court to condone the delay submitted that since the File was processed from one officer to the next officer right from the Court Inspector (C.I.) up to the highest authority of the State, consequently, despite the best efforts put in by the Prosecution the delay occurred in filing the application. He invited the attention of this Court to the decision of the Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others , (2013) 12 SCC 649 and contended that the principles applicable for condonation of delay have been elucidated therein. That, the Supreme Court has observed inter alia that there should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay as the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. That, it was further elucidated that the term “sufficient cause” should be understood in its proper spirit, philosophy and substantial issues should be paramount while technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. Hence, on the bed rock of the principles enunciated in Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) the grounds put forth for the delay in the Petition be given due consideration and the delay condoned.

3. Stridently repudiating the contentions advanced by Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that all that the State-Petitioner has put forth by way of explanation for the delay is that the File was forwarded by the C.I. to the Special Public Prosecutor (POCSO), Sessions Court Namchi, who then forwarded it to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP), Namchi Range, who was responsible for forwarding it to the Special Director General of Police (SDGP), Law and Order and then ultimately to the office of the Advocate General from where it travelled to the highest authority for approval as stated by the Learned Additional Public Prosecutor. Consequent thereto, the Petition as well as the Leave to Appeal was filed. That, such grounds do not culminate in “sufficient cause” but merely exhibit a lackadaisical attitude on the part of the Prosecution and the Police Officers concerned. That, as the grounds fail to explain the delay sufficiently and as the Court is to dispense justice to the litigants before it, which includes the Respondent, who will be prejudiced if the above Petition is allowed, the Petition deserves a dismissal.

4. We have heard Learned Counsel for the parties and given due consideration to their submissions. The grounds as put forth by the State-Petitioner for the delay are as follows;

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2. That the judgment was pronounce (sic.) on 16.11.2022 in the instant case therefore the present appeal ought to be filed within 90 days i.e. within16.02.2023.

3. That on 6.12.2022 the Superintendent of Police Namchi District, Sikkim forwarded the file to the Court Inspector for reasons of acquittal and whether appeal can be preferred before the Hon’ble High Court of Sikkim.

4. That on 13.12.2022 the Court Inspector forwarded the file to the concerned Spl. P. P. (POCSO) Sessions Court Namchi for opinion whether appeal can be preferred in the instant case.

5. That on 19.12.2022 the Spl. P. P. (POCSO) Sessions Court Namchi was of the opinion that there may be few and trivial grounds for preferring an appeal.

6. That thereafter the file was for