An arbitration clause survives under the doctrine of separability, precluding writ jurisdiction for factual disputes. Furthermore, parties cannot contractually curtail an arbitral tribunal's statutory power to grant interim relief, rendering such restrictive clauses unenforceable.

JUDGMENT :

Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, J.

1. The present writ appeal has been preferred by the appellant assailing the judgment dated 09.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in WP(C) No. 68 of 2025.

2. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge after examining several judgments of the Supreme Court, without examining the merits of the case, came to the following conclusion:

“10. It is therefore no more res integra that the arbitration clause cannot be ousted merely on the ground that the Court has powers to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

11. In light of the foregoing discussions, it needs no reiteration that an arbitration clause was inserted in the IA and an Arbitrator selected by the contending parties. Be that as it may, regardless of the IA subsisting or not (as the dispute between the parties pivots on this point), the arbitration clause, which as already discussed, if it is embedded in the contract survives for the purpose of resolution of disputes between the parties, in view of the concept of separability which is therefore applicable to the instant case.

12. It may be noted that no discussions on the merits of the matter have ensued.

13. In conclusion, the Writ Petition is not maintainable and is disposed of accordingly.”

3. The writ petition had sought directions to quash the Request for Proposal (RFP) No. 022/Power/IPP/2025- 26/03 dated 19.09.2025 issued by the respondent no.1 for development of 99 MW Ting-Ting Hydroelectric Project and to direct the respondents to implement the project as per the existing Implementation Agreement dated 03.09.2008 with the petition.

4. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that the writ petition was maintainable as the Implementation Agreement dated 03.09.2008 between the parties was still in subsistence when the above RFP was issued.

5. The learned Additional Advocate General on the other hand contends that pursuant to the closure of the 99MW Ting-Ting Hydroelectric Project vide notification dated 08.02.2012, the appellant invoked the arbitration clause of the Implementation Agreement pursuant to which an Arbitrator was appointed on 22.08.2015. However, they did not pursue the matter any further which indicated that they had abandoned the project.

6. We have heard Mr. M.G. Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Aarohi Bhalla, learned Additional Advocate General for the State respondents.

7. We notice that the Implementation Agreement, which according to the appellant still subsists, had an Arbitration clause. Although, both the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Additional Advocate General for the State respondents sought to place various facts in the present dispute, we are of the view that these factual disputes can be effectively examined in the arbitration proceedings and it may not be correct to examine it in the present writ appeal against the impugned judgment which has not examined the merits of the case. We are of the view that the Writ Court rightly did not delve into the merits of the divergent views of the parties in the writ proceedings. What compelled the State respondents to order closure of the hydroelectric project in the year 2012 and why the appellant did not pursue the arbitration proceeding initiated by them in the year 2014 are disputed questions of facts which we cannot effectively examine in the present writ appeal.

8. When we expressed our disinclination to interfere with the impug