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1997 Supreme(All) 64

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
G. P. MATHUR, D. C. SRIVASTAVA
BALLABH CHAUBEY - Appellant
Versus
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE (FINANCE), MATHURA - Respondents
CRI. M. W. P. 2954 Of 1996
Decided On : 01/22/1997

Advocates Appeared:
TEJ PAL, Vinod Prasad

Where a statute provides a complete and effective machinery for dealing with a particular matter, a person aggrieved by an order or action taken under that statute should first exhaust the remedies provided under the statute before approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Headnote:

U. P. CONTROL OF GOONDAS ACT, 1970 - SECTION 3 - NOTICE - VALIDITY - WRIT PETITION - MAINTAINABILITY - ALTERNATIVE REMEDY - JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURT UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION - SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS - DISCRETIONARY EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION - SELF-IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS - REMEDY PROVIDED BY STATUTE - EXHAUSTION OF STATUTORY REMEDIES BEFORE APPROACHING HIGH COURT - PRINCIPLE OF NON-BYPASSING STATUTORY MACHINERY - APPLICATION TO PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE ACT - NOTICE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 3 - CHALLENGE AT INITIAL STAGE - PREMATURE AND NOT MAINTAINABLE - WRIT PETITION DISMISSED.

Fact of the Case:

Numerous petitions were filed challenging notices issued by the District Magistrate under Section 3(1) of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970. The petitioners contended that the notices were illegal as they did not mention the general nature of the material allegations against them as required by the Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the writ petitions were premature and not maintainable at the stage of notice. It observed that the petitioners had an alternative remedy under the Act itself, which provided for a full trial where they would have the opportunity to defend themselves and lead evidence. The court also noted that the Act was a self-contained Code that ensured a fair trial and provided a right of appeal against the District Magistrate's order.

Issues: 1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable to challenge a notice issued under Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970, at the initial stage before the commencement of proceedings? 2. Whether the principle of exhausting alternative remedies provided by a statute applies to proceedings under the Act?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and is subject to self-imposed limitations. One such limitation is that the High Court will not ordinarily entertain a writ petition where an alternative remedy is available under a statute. 2. The U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 is a self-contained Code that provides a complete and effective machinery for dealing with proceedings against goondas. The Act ensures a fair trial and provides a right of appeal against the District Magistrate's order. Therefore, a person aggrieved by a notice issued under Section 3 of the Act should first exhaust the remedies provided under the Act before approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Final Decision: The writ petitions challenging the notices issued under Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 were dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.

G. P. MATHUR, J.

( 1 ) A large number of petitions have been filed challenging the notices issued by the District Magistrate under Section 3 (1) of U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Two such petitions in which leading arguments have been advanced are being disposed of by a common order.

( 2 ) THE only ground on which the validity of the notice has been assailed is that the general nature of the material allegations against the petitioner in respect of clauses (a) (b) and (c) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the Act have not been mentioned therein and therefore, in view of the Full Bench decision in Ramji Pandey v. State of U. P. 1982 Cri LJ 1083 : (1981 All LJ 897) the same was illegal. Learned State Counsel has submitted that the petitioners have been merely served with a notice and they have yet to appear before the District Magistrate in response to the same and, therefore, the writ petition at this stage is premature and should not be entertained. It may be pointed out that challenge to notice is not based upon want of jurisdiction.


( 3 ) IN order to examine the contention raised by learned counsel for the parties, it will be convenient to briefly refer to the provisions of the Act. Sub-Section (b) of Section 2 defines goonda and means a person who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI, XVII or XXII of the Indian Penal Code or has been convicted under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, or has been convicted not less than thrice under the U. P. Excise Act or is generally reputed to be a person who is desperately dangerous to the community. Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 provides that wherever it appears to the District Magistrate that any person is a Goonda and that his movements or acts in the district or any part thereof are causing or are calculated to cause alarm, or harm to persons or property, or that there are reason-able grounds for believing that he is engaged or about to engage in the District or any part thereof in the commission of any offence punishable under Chapters XVI, XVII and XXII of the Penal Code or under Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act or under the U. P. Excise Act or in the abetment of any such offence and that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence against him by reason of apprehension on their part as regards safety of their persons or property, the District Magistrate shall by notice in writing inform him of the general nature of the material allegations against him and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 provides that the person against whom an order is proposed to be made shall have the right to consult and be defended by a counsel of his choice and shall be given a reasonable opportunity of examining himself and also of examining any other witnesses that he may wish to produce in support of his explanation. Sub-Section (3) provides that the District Magistrate on being satisfied that the conditions specified in clauses (a) (b) and (c) of Sub-Section (1) exist may by order in writing direct him to remove himself outside the district or part as the case may be and within such time as may be specified in the order and to desist from entering the District or specified part thereof until the expiry of such period not exceeding six months. The order may also require such persons to notify his movement or to report himself to such authority or person as may be specified and prohibit or restrict possession or use by him any such article as may be specified and to conduct himself in such manner as may be specified in the order until the expiry of such period but not exceeding six months. Section 4 empowers the District Magistrate to permit any person in respect of whom an order has been made under Section 3 to e









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