( 1 ) THE first appeal has been filed by State of Uttar Pradesh against the judgment and decree dt. 30-3-1976, passed by the District Judge, Meerut in Land Acquisition Reference No. 118 of 1974, awarding compensation to the respondents for their land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) at the rate of Rs. 6/- per sq. yard. The notification under S. 4 (1) of the Act was made on 13-8-1962. Some adjoining land at the same site belonging to other persons had also been acquired in respect of which compensation had been determined at the rate of Rs. 6/- per sq. yard by this Court in an appeal filed in this behalf against the judgment of the District Judge. For the State of Uttar Pradesh, appellant, reliance was placed on a sale deed as an exemplar indicating that the land was sold at a lesser price in the neighbourhood. The District Judge did not place reliance on the said sale deed on the ground that it had been executed about 4 years prior to the acquisition of the land of the claimant-respondents. He on the other hand placed reliance on the judgment of this Court, whereby the compensation in respect of the adjoining land had been awarded at the rate of Rs. 6/- per sq. yard. In this connection, the District Judge has pointed out that the land in respect of which compensation at the rate of Rs. 6/- per sq. yard had been determined by the High Court was acquired at the same time as the land of the claimants respondents.

( 2 ) IT has been urged by the counsel for appellant that the judgment of this Court in another case, which was not inter partes, was not admissible and could not be taken into consideration by the District Judge in determining the amount of compensation. In this connection, our attention was invited to Ss. 40, 41 and 42 of the Evidence Act and it was pointed out that the judgment relied on by the District Judge did not fall within any of the categories mentioned in these three sections. He, then, placed reliance on S. 43 of the Evidence Act, which contemplates that a judgment, order or decree other than those mentioned in Ss. 40,41, and 42 is irrelevant unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue or is relevant under some other provision of that Act. In our opinion even if the judgment of this Court relied on by the District Judge was not admissible under Ss. 40, 41 and 42 of the Evidence Act, it was certainly admissible under S. 11 of the said Act and in view of the last clause of S. 43 which refers to a judgment, order or decree being relevant under some other provision of the Act, the said judgment of the High Court was admissible and rightly taken into consideration by the District Judge. In Collector of Bilaspur v. Lachhman, AIR 1965 Him Pra 18, a similar question arose for consideration. In a case about determination of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act reliance was sought to be placed on an earlier judgment in the case of one Mehta Nand Lal. It was urged that the said judgment was inadmissible. Repelling this submission it was held that :-"it is true that the judgment in Mehta Nand Lals case (F. A. No. 12 of 1962, Him Pra) was not inter partes and is not admissible, either under S. 40 or 41 or S. 42 of the Evidence Act. But judgment, not inter partes, may be admissible under other sections of the Evidence Act, read with S. 43 of that Act, under certain circumstances and for certain limited purposes. Their Lordships of the Privy Council had admitted Magistrates orders, not inter partes, passed under S. 145, Cr. P. C. in Dinomoni Chowdhrani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhrani, (1902) 29 Ind App 24 (P. C. ). Their Lordships observed as follows:"these police orders are in their Lordships opinion admissible in evidence on general principles as well as under S. 13 of the Indian Evidence Act to show the fact that such orders were made. This necessarily makes them evidence of the following facts, all of which appear from the orders