( 1 ) GURTU, J. has referred to us the entire appeal with the following question for specific opinion :

"whether the order of the mutation court embodying a petition of compromise affecting immovable property worth more than Rs. 100/- which purports to regulate the future rights of the parties in that property is conclusive and binding upon them in respect of the property, even though it is not registered?"

( 2 ) IT seems to me that the question assumes three things firstly, that in the instant case the order of the mutation court embodies the petition of compromise affecting immovable property worth more than Rs. 100 which purports to regulate the future rights of the parties in that property; secondly, that the petition of compromise, having been embodied in the order, becomes admissible; and, thirdly, the compromise evidenced by the order is conclusive and binding upon the parties. I have, therefore thought it proper to split up and reformulate the question in my own language in this manner :

1. Whether the order of the mutation court embodies the petition of compromise filed by the parties before us in the court of the mutation officer? 2. Whether the said compromise application-declares rights to immovable property worth more than Rs. 100/-, and is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration? 3. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, whether the order of the mutation-court is an order within the meaning of Clause (vi) of Sub-section (2) of sec. 17 of the Registration act? 4. If the answer to the third question is in the affirmative, whether the said order is admissible in evidence? 5. If the answer to the 4th question is in the affirmative, whether the compromise embodied in the order also becomes admissible in evidence? 6. Whether the compromise as evidenced by the order is binding and conclusive on the parties, even though it is not registered as required by law?

( 3 ) FACTS no longer in dispute are these: In 1942. on the death of Mst. Gaugi, the widow of the last male owner, Sheo Shankar Chaube, the-appellant, a son of the daughter of his predeceased son, and the respondent, his nephew, claimed mutation of their names over the deceaseds estate, which also comprised the suit property, but by an application, dated January 13, 1943. they requested the Sub Divisional Officer, seized of the mutation case, to mutate their names over the property in accordance with the mutual settlement embodied in the application. Accordingly the appellants name was mutated, in respect of the suit property, and the respondents name over the remainder. Respondent, however, instituted a suit for recovery of the suit-property; the suit was1 decreed on appeal by the Civil judge, who held that the application, dated January 13, 1943 which formed the basis of mutation, could not confer any right to suit property on the appellant and was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration.

( 4 ) I shall now narrate the material contents of the compromise application. It comprises three parts, the preamble, the prayer and the terms of compromise, and the list of property. The preamble recites the claim of each party to the estate, and then declares that with a view to avoid ruinous litigation they have settled their differences and have arrived at a compromise through good counsel of their relations. There is then a prayer that the case should be decided and the names of the parties should be mutated in accordance with the compromise. Then there follow two clauses; (i) the name of the appellant should be mutated over the suit property. In the sentence following it is declared that over that property he would remain in possession as absolute owner and that the respondent would have no concern with it; (ii) the name of the respondent should be mutated over the remaining property. In the next sentence it is then declared that he would possess it as absolute owner, and that the appellant would have no concern with i