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1959 Supreme(All) 32

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
A. P. Srivastava and S. K. Verma, JJ.
MEHAR CHAND - Appellant
Versus
STATE - Respondents
Criminal Revn. 1589 Of 1958 (connected with) Criminal Appeal No. 1174 of 1956
Decided On : 02/16/1959

Advocates Appeared:
SHAMBHU PRASAD

Headnote:

INDIAN ARMS ACT - SECTION 29 - CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENDERS BASED ON GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION - DISCRIMINATION - ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION - VOID - SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION - NECESSITY.

Fact of the Case:

Meharchand and Sarupa were convicted under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act for possessing unlicensed arms and ammunition. In Meharchand's case, no sanction was obtained for his prosecution as required by Section 29 of the Act, which exempted certain areas from the requirement of prior sanction. Sarupa's case raised the question of whether Section 29 violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, which exempted certain areas from the requirement of prior sanction for prosecution under Section 19(f), was discriminatory and violated Article 14 of the Constitution. The court found that the classification of offenders based on geographical location was not justified and had no rational connection to the object of the Act, which was to prevent indiscriminate prosecution for offenses related to arms and ammunition.

Issues: 1. Whether Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, which exempted certain areas from the requirement of prior sanction for prosecution under Section 19(f), was discriminatory and violated Article 14 of the Constitution. 2. Whether the classification of offenders based on geographical location was justified and had a rational connection to the object of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution, which prohibits discrimination and guarantees equality before the law. The court held that the classification of offenders based on geographical location in Section 29 was not founded on an intelligible differentia and did not have a rational relation to the object of the Act. The court found that there was no nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act, and that the discrimination was unjustified.

Final Decision: The court held that Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act was void to the extent of its inconsistency with Article 14 of the Constitution. The court set aside the convictions of Meharchand and Sarupa, as no sanction was obtained for their prosecution.

SRIVASTAVA, J.

( 1 ) WE have before us an application in revision on behalf of Meharchand and a reference made by Oak, J. in an appeal on behalf of Sarupa.

( 2 ) THE applicant Meharchand was convicted by the Railway Magistrate of Saharanpur under section 19 (f) of the Indian Arms Act and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. It was found against him that on 26-1-1956 at about 1-30 p. m. while he was at platform No. 5 of the railway station at Saharanpur he had in his possession a loaded country-made pistol and four 12 bore live cartridges for which he did not possess any licence. As the offence had been committed in the district of Saharanpur no sanction was obtained for his prosecution as required by Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act. Against his conviction the applicant went up in anneal to the Sessions Judge but the findings recorded by the Magistrate against him were confirmed and his conviction and sentence were both upheld.

( 3 ) THE appellant in the other case, Sarupa, has also been convicted under Section 19 (f) of the arms Act but by the Sessions Judge of Bifnor. It has been found against him that in the night between the 26th and 27th October 1955 Sarupa was found in the possession of an unlicensed gun along with three live cartridges in respect of which he had no licence.

( 4 ) WHEN the appeal of Sarupa came up before Mr. Justice Oak it was contended that his conviction stood vitiated because no sanction had been obtained for his prosecution from the district Magistrate. The learned counsel for the State, however, relied on Section 29 of the indian Arms Act and contended that no sanction was necessary in the case of Sarupa because he had committed the offence in the district of Bijnor which was situated north of the river Ganges. Mr. Justice Oak was of opinion that Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, though it may have been valid before 1950, had become void after the coming into force of the Constitution. A decision of mr. Justice Dayal in Jai Prakash v. State, Criminal Revn. No. 942 of 1954, D/- 5-7-1954 (All), was, however, cited before him in which an opinion had been expressed that Section 29 of the arms Act did not contravene Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Oak felt it desirable that the question should be considered by a Division Bench. He therefore referred the following question for being decided by a Division Bench : "whether that part of Section 29, Indian Arms Act, which does not extend the protection of the section to certain parts of Uttar Pradesh is void under Article 13 read with Article 14 of the constitution. "

( 5 ) THIS very point has been raised by the learned counsel for Meharchand in his application for revision. He too contends that the conviction of Meharchand is bad because in bis case too sanction was not obtained from the District Magistrate and meets the States contention that no sanction was necessary in view of the provisions of Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act by urging that that provision be~ ing discriminatory is constitutionally invalid.

( 6 ) SECTION 29 of the Indian Arms Act reads as follows :

"where an offence punishable under Section 19v Clause (f), has been committed within three month* from the date on which this Act comes into force in any province, district or place to which Section 32, Clause 2, of Act XXXI of 1860 applies at such date, or where such an offence has been committed in any part of British India not being such a district, province or place no proceedings shall be instituted against any person in respect of such offence without the previous sanction of the Magistrate off the District or, in a presidency town, of the Commissioner of police. "

( 7 ) UNDER this section the necessity for obtain-ing a sanction for the prosecution of a person under Section 19 (f) of the Arms Act depends on whether Section 32, Clause 2, of Act XXXI of 1860 was in force at the place where the offence was committed in the year 1878 when the indian Arms























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