K. C. AGRAWAL, J.:- Having felt that the question involved in the present case was of importance, Hon. S.D. Agarwala, J., referred this writ petition for decision by a larger Bench.

2. The facts of this case, briefly stated, are these, Smt. Siddiqa Begum, respondent 3, filed a suit in the Court of Judge Small Causes, Rampur, for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent and damages against the petitioner, on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent. The summons of the suit was served upon the petitioner on 6th July, 1978. The summons was not accompanied by a copy of the plaint. On Feb. 7, 1978. the petitioner appeared before the Judge Small Causes and pointed out to him that the summons served upon him did not accompany a copy of the plaint. Thereupon, the Court granted time up to 13th Feb, 1978, to the petitioner tenant to pay the arrears of rent, and fixed 14th Feb. 1978, for filing of the written statement. The petitioner-tenant deposited the arrears of rent and costs on 14th Feb. 1978.

3. Having deposited the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from the petitioner together with interest thereon and costs of the suit in respect thereof, the petitioner claimed the benefit of sub-sec.(4) of Sec.20 of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act XIII of 1972). The Judge Small Causes held that as the amount required by the aforesaid sub-sec.(4) of Sec.20 was not deposited on 7th Feb, 1978, which was the date for "first hearing" within the meaning of Explanation (a) to sub-sec.(4) of S.20, the petitioner was not entitled to the immunity from ejectment on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent. In the revision preferred against the said judgment of the Judge Small Causes under Sec.25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the judgment and decree of ejectment granted by the Judge Small Causes on the ground of default was maintained. Having felt aggrieved, the petitioner has come to this Court.

4. The question that arises for our consideration in the present case is about the interpretation of Explanation (a) to sub-sec.(4) of S.20 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, which reads as under :

"Explanation - For the purpose of this sub-section -

(a) the expression first hearing means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant.

(b) ..........................."

5. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that as the summons served on the petitioner for appearance on the 7th of Feb. 1978, was not accompanied by a copy of the plaint, the Explanation did not apply, hence failure to deposit the amounts mentioned in sub-sec.(4) of S.20 by the petitioner on 7th Feb. 1978, could not be a ground to deny the petitioner the benefit contemplated by the said provision.

6. The expression "first hearing" has been defined by adding the aforesaid Explanation by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. Before the aforesaid Amending Act, this expression had not been defined and the Courts had interpreted the same in a number of decision. As the expression "first hearing" has now been defined, sub-Sec.(4) of S.20 has to be read in the light of the said meaning or definition given in the said Explanation. According to Expln.(a), the expression first hearing would mean the first date mentioned in the summons served on the defendant. Service of summons is dealt with in O.V of the Civil P.C.O.V.R. 2 of the Civil P.C. with which we are concerned in the present case, reads as under:-

"Every summons shall be accompanied by a copy of the plaint......."

7. This provision makes it incumbent and mandatory for every summons to be accompanied by a copy of the plaint. When a statute uses the word "shall" prima facie it is mandatory. The word "shall" raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative. In ordinary parlance, the term "shall" is considered as a word of command and one which alw