By the Court.—The reference before the Full Bench has been occasioned as a result of a referring order dated 30 September 2013. Essentially, the issue which arises before the Full Bench can be summarized briefly as follows: Where a Court has prescribed time for the disposal of a disciplinary enquiry and the enquiry is not concluded within the time so fixed, would the consequence in law be to vitiate the enquiry proceedings resulting in rendering the penalty imposed as being without jurisdiction?

2. The following questions have been referred in the order of the learned Single Judge for determination by the Full Bench :

“(a) Whether if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within a time frame fixed by a Court and concluded thereafter, without seeking extension from the Court then on the said ground the entire inquiry proceeding as well as punishment order passed, is vitiated in view of the judgment in the case of P.N. Srivastava; and

(b) Whether the law as laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of P.N. Srivastava that if an inquiry proceeding is not concluded within a time frame as fixed by a Court, it stands vitiated is still a good law in view of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra as well as a judgment dated 27.7.2009 of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1056 (SB) of 2009 (Union of India and others v. Satendra Kumar Sahai and another).

3. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Clerk in New India Assurance Company Ltd. on 10 July 1986. He was suspended on 19 March 2008 in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding. As the charge-sheet was not served, he moved a representation to the disciplinary authority to revoke the order of suspension under the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975. In a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court directed, by an order dated 4 November 2008, that the representation of the petitioner be disposed of by a speaking order. On 7 November 2008, a memorandum of charges was served. On 19 February 2009, the representation submitted by the petitioner for the revocation of suspension was rejected. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a writ petition in which, by an order dated 30 March 2009, a direction was issued to the disciplinary authority to conclude the enquiry within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. The certified copy of the order was received by the employer on 6 April 2009. The enquiry report is dated 17 August 2009 and was remitted to the employee under a covering letter dated 15 October 2009. The enquiry report was actually remitted on 6 November 2009 and was received by the petitioner on 11 November 2009.

4. As a matter of first principle, when a mandamus is issued by a Court to complete an act within a stipulated period, the binding direction of the Court has to be complied with. A litigating party cannot ignore or disregard a mandamus of the Court. Hence, when a stipulation as to time is made in an order of the Court directing the conclusion of a disciplinary enquiry, the direction of the Court binds the parties and must be observed.

5. In M.L. Sachdev v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 605, a direction was issued by the Supreme Court for the constitution of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission within a stipulated period. The direction was not duly observed and contempt proceedings were initiated. In that context, the Supreme Court held that since the direction was not complied with by the date stipulated, it was the obligation of the contemnor to approach the Court for a further extension of time or to receive such directions as the Court, in its discretion, thought it appropriate to make. A similar principle was followed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and others v. Subhash Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 430, where an order of costs was imposed. The Supreme Court observed that