An employee involved in a criminal case, despite subsequent acquittal, may not be entitled to full salary for a suspension period if the involvement in the crime disabled the employee from rendering service.

JUDGMENT :

ABDUL MOIN, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing counsel appearing on behalf of the State-respondents.

2. With the consent of learned counsel appearing for the contesting parties, the instant writ petition is being finally decided.

3. Instant writ petition has been filed praying for quashing of the order dated 22.06.2023, a copy of which is Annexure 1 to the writ petition as well as praying for a mandamus commanding the respondents to pay full salary to the petitioner during his suspension period from 06.09.2011 till 24.10.2016.

4. The case set forth by the petitioner is that while the petitioner was working as Assistant Teacher, a First Information Report was lodged against the petitioner in the year 2011 registered as Case Crime No. 528 of 2011 under Section 498-A, 304 B I.P.C and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The petitioner was arrested on 07.09.2011 and thereafter enlarged on bail on 20.09.2016. His arrest entailed the respondents to place the petitioner under deemed suspension w.e.f. 06.09.2011 which continued till 14.11.2016. No departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. It is contended that the petitioner has subsequently been acquitted in the criminal case vide judgment dated 11.11.2022, a copy of which is Annexure 7 to the writ petition. It is further contended that initially the petitioner had filed a W.P. No. 22263 of 20147 in Pradeep Kumar vs. District Inspector of Schools and Others praying for being paid subsistence allowance. The writ Court vide order dated 18.09.2017, a copy of which is Annexure 4 to the writ petition disposed of the writ petition with the direction to the District Inspector of Schools concerned to examine the claim of the petitioner for payment of subsistence allowance.

5. In pursuance thereof, an order dated 25.05.2018, a copy of which is Annexure 5 to the writ petition, was passed by the District Inspector of Schools whereby the petitioner was found entitled for payment of subsistence allowance but the same was not paid to him. Subsequent thereto, another order dated 09.06.2020, a copy of which is Annexure 6 to the writ petition, was passed whereby considering that the petitioner was deemed to have been placed under suspension on 06.09.2011 and the deemed suspension came to an end on 14.11.2016 as such, it was provided that the petitioner would be paid subsistence allowance in accordance with Regulation 53 Part II of Financial Handbook. Despite the aforesaid order, the subsistence allowance was not paid to the petitioner for the aforesaid period.

6. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed Writ (A) No. 6818 of 2022 before this Court praying for being granted subsistence allowance which is said to be still pending for consideration before this Court.

7. During the pendency of the aforesaid petition, the respondents have passed the order impugned dated 22.06.2023, a copy of which is Annexure 1 to the writ petition, whereby the claim of the petitioner for subsistence allowance has been negated on the ground that as per rules, he has not been found entitled for payment of subsistence allowance.

8. Being aggrieved, the instant petition has been filed.

9. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that when earlier, the respondents vide the orders dated 25.05.2018 and 09.06.2020 found the petitioner entitled for being paid subsistence allowance for the deemed period of suspension from 06.09.2011 to 14.11.2016 consequently there cannot be any occasion for the respondents to have negated the claim of the petitioner by means of the impugned order dated 22.06.2023 by a non-speaking order and by simply indicating that the petitioner has not been found legally entitled for the payment of subsistence allowance without indicating the reason as to why he has not found entitled for the said payment.

10. The other argument is that as the petitioner was kept away from work on account of his deemed suspension for the period from 06.09.2011 to 14.11.