The main legal point established in the judgment is that the nature of employment and termination must be analyzed in the context of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the court must ensure that the reference is within the scope of the dispute referred to it.

JUDGMENT :

1. Arguments in Writ-C No.30049 of 2016 were heard and judgment was reserved on 16.05.2023, whereas arguments in Writ-C No.30052 of 2016 were heard on 18.05.2023 and the judgment was reserved on the same day noting the fact that the controversy involved in the writ petition heard later was identical to the writ petition heard earlier.

2. Both the learned counsel jointly agree that exactly identical questions are involved in both the writ petitions and even the notes and case law supplied by both the learned counsel, according to them, would cover controversy of both the cases. Therefore, both the writ petitions are being decided by a common judgment. For the sake of convenience, Writ-C No.30049 of 2016 is being treated as the leading case.

3. This petition has been filed challenging the impugned award dated 10.09.2015, published on the notice board on 05.05.2016 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (4), U.P., Agra with a further prayer in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no.3 to reinstate the petitioner on the post of Clerk Grade-III along with 50% back-wages and pay him salary according to law as and when due in future.

The Writ Petition

4. The facts of the case are that the respondent no.3 (hereinafter referred to as the Company) appointed the petitioner on the post of temporary Clerk Grade-III on 01.06.1994 and, according to the petitioner, he was permitted to work till 07.01.1995, approximately for a period of 221 days, whereafter his services were disengaged. The petitioner was further engaged on 16.06.1995 on the same post and such engagement ended on 07.01.1996 i.e. he was allowed to work for a period of 206 days. Thereafter, the petitioner kept getting rehired, relieved and again engaged on the same pattern consecutively for four years until 08.02.2000. The case of the petitioner is that artificial breaks in service were created so that he might not complete 240 days in continuous employment and the intention of the Company was to deprive him of his statutory rights and benefits. The petitioner has given details of his engagements in the following manner:

“01.06.1994 to 07.01.1995 (221 days)

16.06.1995 to 07.01.1996 ((206 days)

14.04.1997 to 22.11.1997 (223 days)

08.07.1998 to 07.02.1999 (215 days)

08.07.1999 to 07.02.2000 (215 days)”

5. The case of the petitioner is that the Company was aware of the fact that in case the petitioner would complete 240 days in a calendar year, he would attain the deemed status of a permanent employee and the Company would be obliged to confirm him in services as per the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to Act, 1947).

6. The entire case of the petitioner, as per the writ petition and also as per the detailed arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the Company adopted “unfair labour practices” as defined under Section 2 (ra) which means any of the practices specified in the 5th Schedule. Learned counsel argued and in the present case Entry No.10, contained in 5th Schedule, is attracted which reads as follows:-

“10. To employ workmen as “badlies”, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.”

7. The case of the petitioner is that his services were terminated on 08.02.2000, whereafter he represented to the authorities but having failed in his attempt to seek re-engagement/ re-employment, matter was agitated before the authorities under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, ultimately, the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, 4th, Agra where it was registered as Adjudication Case No.2 of 2006. After considering the case of the parties, the Tribunal, by impugned award dated 10.09.2015, dismissed the adjudication case.

8. The petitioner contends that the Tribunal has no