Jurisdiction of the labour court under section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is limited, and the court cannot entertain a dispute for a subsequent period when an earlier award has already been satisfied.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shobh Nath Pandey, the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.

2. The present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 17.04.2017 passed by the labour court in exercise of the powers under section 33(C)(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

3. The facts, in brief, are that the respondent claiming himself to be employed with the petitioner filed an application under the Payment of Wages Act alleging that the wages paid to the petitioner were less than the wages to which the petitioner was entitled and by means of the order dated 29.03.2004, the authority under the payment of wages act determined that the petitioner was paid wages less by Rs.1077/-and accepted the contention of the respondent for payment of difference of payment of wages for the period December 2001 to April 2002 and thus passed an award directing the petitioner to pay the amount of Rs.21,740/-. The said award was never challenged and the admitted position as of now is that the petitioner has been paid the amount as awarded by the prescribed authority under the Payment of Wages Act. After the said award, the respondent preferred an application under section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act claiming that once the wages were determined by means of the order dated 29.03.2004, for the subsequent period also, the respondent has not been paid wages of which he was entitled. Based upon the said application, an order was passed holding that the respondent was entitled to difference of payment of wages for the period December 2001 up to June 2006 (fifty five months) and the same were quantified and awarded at Rs.59,235/-with a further penalty of Rs.59,235/-was also imposed and the petitioners were directed to pay a total amount of Rs.1,18,470/-to the respondent. The said order is under challenge in the present proceedings.

4. The counsel for the petitioner argues that the order passed in exercise of powers under section 33(C)(2) of the Act is bad in law inasmuch as the award in favour of the respondent dated 29.03.2004 had quantified the dues payable to the respondent at Rs.21,740/-, the authority under section 33(C)(2) could not have determined the amount allegedly due by the respondent for the period other than claimed leading to passing of the award dated 29.03.2004. It is further argues that the respondent had drawn the bills for payment of his dues and after he was terminated, the respondent preferred the application. In fact the respondent challenged the termination order by filing a writ petition before this court, which was dismissed directing the respondent to prefer a claim under section 70 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act. It is stated that the respondent did not file any proceedings under section 70 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act and instead filed an application under section 33 (C) (2) of the Act, which has been allowed. He further argues that although the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, had the power to pass an award, however, the labour court does not have any jurisdiction to entertain any dispute in between the Cooperative Society and its Members except by way of invoking the procedure as prescribed under Section 70 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ghaziabad Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd. vs. Additional Labour Commissioner and others; 2007 (11) SCC 756 as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prabhu Dayal vs. Sadhan Sahkari Samiti Mujuri Vikas Khand, Paniyara and others; 2008 (4) SCC 34. In the light of the said judgments, he argues that the labour court did not have the jurisdiction, as such, the order deserves to be set aside.

6. The counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, tries to justify the order by arguing that once the prescribed authority under the Payment of Wages Act had quantified the salary payable to the