Interlocutory orders prejudicial to a party can be challenged in a single revision along with the final order, as established in Section 105(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

JUDGMENT :

This revision is directed against three distinct orders passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 9, Budaun in Execution Case No. 1 of 2012, arising out of the decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 8, Budaun in Original Suit No. 2 of 2001, Bharat Kumar and others v. Ishwar Sharan, a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, [“Code” for short]. The first order impugned is one dated 24.01.2022, rejecting the application, Paper No. 54 x made in the execution by one Gaurav Das, claiming to bring on record a registered will dated 21.12.2016 in his favour, executed by the late Ishwar Sharan, the former sarvarakar of the temple subject matter of the decree passed in the suit under Section 92 of the Code. The second is an order dated 03.03.2022, by which, the scheme of administration submitted by the revisionist, claiming to be the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor, Ishwar Sharan Das has not been accepted, whereas that submitted by the decree holder, Paper No. 9 x has been accepted. The last is an order dated 05.03.1992, by which the execution proceedings have been ordered to be struck off in full satisfaction.

2. Mr. Rahul Sahai, learned Counsel appearing for respondent no. 1 has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of this revision. He submits that the three orders impugned have been passed on three different applications, and, may be, a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code. But, each would give rise to a distinct and separate right to the revisionist to prefer a revision to this Court. It is Mr. Sahai’s submission is that the revisionist cannot prefer a single revision against the three orders impugned.

3. In answering the aforesaid objection, Mr. Bhola Nath Yadav, learned Counsel for the revisionist has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra and others, (2011) 2 SCC 705. He has drawn the attention of this Court to Paragraphs Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of the report in Rajendra Prasad Gupta (supra)where it has been held :

5. In Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey [ILR (1883) 5 All 163], Mahmood, J. the celebrated Judge of the Allahabad High Court, observed:

“Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle prohibition cannot be presumed.”

6. The above view was followed by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Raj Narain Saxena v. Bhim Sen [AIR 1966 All 84] and we agree with this view. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the application praying for withdrawal of the withdrawal application was maintainable. We order accordingly.

7. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. No costs. The suit shall proceed and to be decided on merits, expeditiously.

4. He submits that the objection raised is no more than a technicality or something to do with rules or procedure. He has emphasized that rules of procedure are hand-maid of justice and so long as a substantially wrong order is there on record, this Court has ample jurisdiction to correct those wrong orders, in exercise of powers of revision, even if more than one orders are challenged in a single revision. Mr. Yadav has placed further reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Achal Misra v. Rama Shanker Singh and others, (2005) 5 SCC 531. Attention of the Court is drawn to the holding in Paragraphs Nos. 12 and 13 of the report, that read :

13. This principle is recognised by Section 105(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and reaffirmed by Order 43 Rule 1-A of the Code. The two exceptions to this rule are found in Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides that a preliminary decree