The main legal point established in the judgment is that the proviso to Section 115 (1) CPC applies to interim non-appealable orders made in the course of a suit or other proceeding, and does not bar revision against the final appellate order in appeals under Section 104 or Order 43 Rule 1 CPC.

( 1 ) THIS is a revision by the plaintiffs under Section 115 CPC against the order by which their appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) CPC challenging the order of the rejection of their application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC filed in the suit, has been dismissed.

( 2 ) A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondent No. 3 that the present revision is not maintainable in view of the proviso to Section 115 (1) CPC. Reliance is placed by him on the decision of this Court in Sawal Singh v. Smt. Ramsakhi, (2002) 2 MPJR 169 : 2003 AIHC 1737. This objection has been raised in several other revision petitions pending before this Court. Therefore, arguments were heard at length. Sarvashri Ravish Agrawal, Sr. Advocate, R. P. Agrawal, Sr. Advocate, R. P. Jain, R. S. Tiwari, P. D. Tiwari, Alok Aradhe and Ajay Mishra, Advocates have also addressed this Court on this point.

( 3 ) THE proviso to Section 115 (1) CPC reads as under :-"provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings". (Underlined by me)

( 4 ) THE short question which arises in the present revision is whether the final appellate order passed in appeal under Section 104 or Order 43 Rule 1 CPC is an "order in the course of a suit" within the meaning of these words in the Proviso and therefore, a revision against such order would not be maintainable.

( 5 ) THE aforesaid proviso has been considered in great detail in Sawal Singh v. Ram Sakhi, (2002) 2 MPJR 169 : 2003 AIHC 1737 and the following three conclusions have been drawn in Para 15 which form the ratio of the decision :- (a) The revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code is available against; (i) the order deciding finally the suit or other proceedings where no appeal is provided, and (ii) where effect of order in the revision would finally dispose of the suit or other proceedings. (b) The revisional jurisdiction will not be exercised in respect of all other orders 'deciding any case' in the course of suit or other proceedings, though there may be any error, defect, irregularity or illegality in exercise of jurisdiction, where allowing the revision would not finally dispose of the suit or other proceedings. (c) all the pending revisions on 1-7-2002 will be decided as per the amended provisions of Section 115.

( 6 ) I am in full and respectful agreement with my learned and noble brother K. K. Lahoti, J. in respect of all the three propositions of law given above. But the elucidation or clarification of the law already laid down is permissible by the same Bench and also by any co-ordinate Bench.

( 7 ) THE word 'order' occurs thrice in the Proviso. It has to be ascribed the same meaning in all the three places. It is indisputable that any order made "in the course of a suit" would be an interim or interlocutory order. The suit commences with the presentation of the plaint and ends with the judgment and the decree. Any order passed in the course of the suit during its pendency would be an interim order. The same would be the position in the case of "other proceedings" akin to that of a suit e. g. proceedings under the Indian Succession Act or the Arbitration Act. It is only the interim order in the course of a suit or other proceeding which is covered by the Proviso. The present Proviso was Proviso (a) before the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 and after the Amendment Act of 1976. Mulla in his Commentary on CPC 15th Edition Vol. I page 824 has stated : "the proviso deals with interlocutory orders only". In Sawal Singh's case also it has been unequivocally held in paras 9 and 10 that the effect of the amendment is that the "interim orders" which have been passed in the course of a