The amended provisions of the Mines and Minerals Act did not entitle leaseholders to revive an expired lease, as per the express exclusion in Section 8-A (9) of the Act.

ORDER :

1. The present writ petition has been filed impugning the orders dated September 3, 2019 and September 7, 2019 passed by respondent Nos. 1 and 3 respectively, vide which the claim of the petitioners for extension of lease beyond 40 years till 50 years, was rejected.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners were granted mining lease of silika sand on January 18, 1973 for a period of 20 years. It expired on January 17, 1993. They applied for renewal thereof well within time in terms of Rule 24-A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1960 Rules'). There was deemed renewal of petitioners' lease for another period of 20 years. It was to expire on January 17, 2013. Well before expiry of the aforesaid lease period, the petitioners filed application for second renewal thereof. While referring to the provisions of Section 8-A of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1957 Act'), which was inserted in the 1957 Act with effect from January 12, 2015 and relying upon a judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Common Cause Vs. Union of India and others, (2016) 11 SCC 455, the petitioners sought to claim that they were entitled to renewal of lease for a period of 10 years. The claim of the petitioners was rejected.

3. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioners is based on the observation made by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Paragraph 37.5 in Common Cause's case (supra) which, according to him, provides for renewal of the lease after the amendment in the 1957 Act with effect from January 12, 2015.

4. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioners, we do not find any merit in the submissions made. The petitioners were entitled to renewal of their lease in the year 1993 in terms of the provision existing at that time. The same was renewed and expired on January 17, 2013. No provision was referred to, which provided automatic second renewal of the lease. In fact, admittedly, the lease of the petitioners expired on January 17, 2013. They never raised any grievance, either before the expiry thereof or subsequent thereto, about disposal of the application filed by the petitioners for renewal of lease. What is evident from the record is that after the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Common Cause (supra), the petitioners again filed application for renewal of their lease. The impugned order has been passed thereon.

5. Considering the facts of the present case where the lease of the petitioners expired on January 17, 2013 and the provisions of Section 8-A of the 1957 Act having come into force on January 12, 2015, in our opinion, the petitioners could not have got their lease, which had already expired, revived. The judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court does not come to their rescue in terms of the observation made in the last paragraph thereof which provides that any leaseholder having suffered lapse, would be dis-entitled to any benefit of the amended provisions of the 1957 Act because of the express exclusion contemplated in Section 8-A (9) of the 1957 Act.

6. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not find any merit in the present writ petition.

7. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.