IMPORTANT POINT
The right to appeal is a vested right that cannot be retroactively altered by subsequent amendments unless explicitly stated.

JUDGMENT :

Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.

Heard Sri Rahul Sahai, alongwith Sri Aditya Singh Parihar, learned counsel for the appellant. Sri Satya Deo Ojha, learned counsel has also been heard.

2. A question has arisen with regard to the maintainability of the instant appeal under Section 173(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in view of the report submitted by the Stamp Reporter.

3. It is pointed out that the aforesaid objection of the Stamp Reporter is based on the amended provision contained under sub-section (2) of Section 173, in terms of which the pecuniary limit for filing of an appeal against an award of a Claims Tribunal, has been raised to 'one lakh rupees' from the earlier limit of 'ten thousand rupees'.

4. Contention of the counsel for the appellant is that the right to file an appeal being a vested right and having accrued on the institution of the claim petition before the Tribunal, the said right cannot be taken away or curtailed by means of a subsequent amendment, particularly, when the said amendment does not have a retrospective effect.

5. For a proper appreciation of the controversy at hand, the provisions of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to the amendment of the year 2019, and as it now stands subsequent to coming into force the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 [Act 32 of 2019], are being reproduced in a tabular form so as to facilitate comparison.

6. A comparative reading of provisions of Section 173, pre and post the amendment would indicate that except for substituting the amount 'one lakh' for the amount 'ten thousand', the provision remains the same as it was earlier.

7. The Amending Act 32 of 2019 provides that the various provisions of the Act would come into force on the dates to be notified by the Central Government. Section 57 of the Amendment Act 2019, which is with regard to the amendment made to Section 173, was notified on 25.2.2022, to come into force w.e.f. 1.4.2022.

8. The question as to whether an appeal under an earlier statute would lie under a new enactment which comes into operation consequent to repeal of the earlier enactment and as to whether such appeal would be subject to the same conditions as were applicable to it under the repealed Act, was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Haldwani v. Dhanram Singh alias Dhan Singh and others, 1990 AWC 67, and placing reliance on an earlier Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary, AIR 1957 SC 540, reiterated that the right of an appeal is a vested right which accrues to the litigant from the date the lis commences and this vested right in the appeal can be taken away by a subsequent enactment, if it is so provided expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.

9. It was accordingly held that an appeal from a proceeding initiated under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, would be maintainable under Section 173 of the Act 59 of 1988 and that the provisions of the Old Act would continue to apply to all appeals which arise from proceedings initiated prior to the enforcement of the New Act. It was made clear that such appeals would not require to comply with the provisions as laid down under Section 173 of the New Act.

10. The question as to whether a right of an appeal under the Old Act survives even after it is repealed by a New Act, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Ramesh Singh and another v. Cinta Devi and others, AIR 1996 SC 1560 and particularly the question that was addressed, was as to whether a right of appeal would accrue to a claimant under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Old Act), on the institution of a claim application in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal notwithstanding with its repeal by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (New Act).

11. The order passed by the High Court dismissing the appeal on the ground that the appellant had not deposited the amount as required by the proviso