Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2024 Supreme(All) 1543

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.
Ascent Education Trust, Kanpur Thru. Chairman Mr. Gurusharan Singh - Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttar Pradesh Thru. Addl. Chief Secy./Prin. Secy. Deptt. of Revenue, Lko. and Others - Respondents
Writ - C No. 7092 of 2024
Decided On : 23-08-2024

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Ram Raj, Gokul Seth, Hanumant Lal Srivastava, Rishabh Raj.
For the Respondent: C.S.C.

IMPORTANT POINT
Admissions made by counsel are binding on their clients unless proven otherwise; clients may dispute recorded concessions in appropriate forums.

Headnote:
(A) Constitution of India - Article 226 - Stamp Duty - Challenge to the order of Collector for deficient stamp duty and penalty - The petitioner contended that no compromise was made regarding the payment of stamp duty, and the concession by counsel was not binding - The court held that admissions by counsel are binding unless proven otherwise, and the petitioner may dispute the correctness of the order before the Commissioner. (Paras 2, 14)
(B) Estoppel - The principle of estoppel applies where a party is precluded from denying a fact due to their previous conduct - The court reiterated that statements made in court are conclusive unless challenged immediately. (Paras 3, 11)
Facts of the case:
The petitioner challenged the Collector's order for deficient stamp duty and penalty, asserting that no valid compromise was made regarding the payment.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the petitioner could not dispute the correctness of the order recorded by the Commissioner but could seek to correct any inaccuracies.
Issues: The main issue was whether the petitioner was bound by the concession made by their counsel regarding the payment of stamp duty.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that admissions made by counsel are generally binding unless the client can prove they were unauthorized or incorrect.
Result: Writ petition disposed off.

JUDGMENT :

Subhash Vidyarthi, J.

1. Heard Sri Rishabh Raj Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, the learned Standing Counsel representing all the opposite parties.

2. By means of the instant Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the validity of an order dated 12.12.2022 passed by the Collector, Unnao, holding that the petitioner has paid a deficient stamp-duty on a sale-deed dated 17.07.2017 executed in its favour and ordering recovery of a sum of Rs. 15,24,220/- towards deficient stamp-duty and an equal amount as penalty. The petitioner has also challenged the validity of an order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow, dismissing the petitioner’s appeal under Section 56 (1-A) of the Indian Stamp Act filed against the aforesaid order passed by the Collector.

3. The learned Standing Counsel has raised a preliminary objection that in the order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the Commissioner Lucknow Division, Lucknow, it is recorded that it was stated on behalf of the petitioner-appellant that the penalty of Rs. 15,24,220/- imposed by the Collector, Unnao be waived and the appellant was ready to deposit the amount of deficient stamp duty i.e. Rs. 15,24,220/-. He has submitted when the order was passed accepting the offer made on behalf of the petitioner itself, it is not open for the petitioner to turn around and challenge the validity of the order. In support of his support of his submission, the learned Standing Counsel relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.L. Sreedhar and others Vs. K.M. Munireddy (Dead) and others, (2003) 2 SCC 355, wherein it has been held that: -

“13. Estoppel is a rule of evidence and the general rule is enacted in Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”) which lays down that when one person has by his declaration, act or omission caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing. (See Sunderabai v. Devaji Shankar Deshpande AIR 1954 SC 82.)

14. “Estoppel is when one is concluded and forbidden in law to speak against his own act or deed, yea, though it be to say the truth” — Co Litt 352(a), cited in Ashpitel v. Bryan [(1863) 3 B & S 474 : 122 ER 179 : 32 LJQB 91] B & S at p. 489; Simm v. Anglo American Telegraph Co. [(1879) 5 QBD 188 : 49 LJQB 392 : 42 LT 37 (CA)], per Bramwell, L.J. at p. 202; Halsbury, Vol. 13, para 488. So there is said to be an estoppel where a party is not allowed to say that a certain statement of fact is untrue, whether in reality it be true or not. Estoppel, or conclusion, as it is frequently called by the older authorities, may therefore be defined as a disability whereby a party is precluded from alleging or proving in legal proceedings that a fact is otherwise than it has been made to appear by the matter giving rise to that disability. (Halsbury, Vol. 13, para 448) The rule on the subject is thus laid down by Lord Denman, in Pickard v. Sears [(1837) 6 Ad & El 469 : 112 ER 179] Ad & E at p. 474 : ER p. 181

“But the rule of law is clear, that, where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time;”

“The whole doctrine of estoppel of this kind, which is a fictitious statement treated as true, might have been founded in reason, but I am not sure that it was. There is another kind of estoppel — estoppel by representation — which is founded upon reason and it is founded upon decision also.” Per Jessel, M.R. in General Finance & Co. v. Liberator [(1878) 1