The court ruled that pending criminal investigations do not automatically bar passport issuance, emphasizing judicial discretion in assessing travel permissions.

JUDGMENT

Heard Shri. Anurag Khanna, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri. Raghav Dev Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri. Yogendra Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. Present petition has been filed for the following main relief :

"Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, directing the passport authorities, i.e., Respondent no. 2 and 3, to process the application and renew the passport of the Petitioner, sought vide Application Reference No. (ARN) 23-0008434106 dated 10.05.2023, being uninfluenced by the pendency of a criminal case against the Petitioner, which is still pending investigation."

3. At the outset, Shri. Anurag Khanna, learned Senior Advocate states that in similar circumstances, other writ petitions have been disposed of by this Court following Basoo Yadav v. Union of India and 4 Others in Writ-C No. 29605 of 2022 decided on 16.12.2022. Certain additional directions have been issued in Pawan Kumar Rajbhar v. Union of India and 2 others, Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:9963-DB.

4. At present, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner would submit, directions issued in Pawan Kumar Rajbhar (supra) requiring the applicant (to reissue passport), to apply to the Court for permission under whose territorial jurisdiction an FIR may have been registered, for permission to travel abroad as a pre-condition for re-issuance of passport, is contrary to the own Circular of Government of India bearing No. VI/401/1/5/2019 dated 10.10.2019. In material parts, Clause 5 (vi) of the Circular reads as below :

"(vi) In case where the secondary Police Verification is also 'Adverse', it may be examined whether the details brought out in the police report match the undertaking submitted by the applicant. It may be noted that mere filing of FIRs and cases under investigation do not come under the purview of Section 6(2)(f) and that criminal proceedings would only be considered pending against an applicant if a case has been registered before any Court of law and the court has taken cognizance of the same."

5. Reference has also been made to two decision of other Courts namely Rajesh Gupta v. Union of India and another, 2022 SCC OnLine J&K 899 and Sharath Chandrasekhar v. Union of India, NC: 2024:KHC:6357. Thus, it has been submitted, directions issued by this Court in Pawan Kumar Rajbhar (supra) have been issued in ignorance of the binding Circular of the Government Of India and in any case they are too harsh to be applied every time. As to the facts of the present petitioner, we find that an FIR has been registered against the petitioner bearing No. RCBD1/2020/E/001, dated 19.10.2020 at P.S. CBI, BSFB, New Delhi, under Section 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC read with Section 120B IPC and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

6. While it is true that the Circular of the Government of India referred to above was not placed before the Court inasmuch as the same has not been considered in Pawan Kumar Rajbhar (supra), at the same time, it cannot be forgotten that Circulars are not pieces of statutory legislation or delegated legislation. They remain executive instructions and at most subject to fulfilment of certain conditions, they may be read against the issuing authority, here the respondents-State authorities, on the principle of contemporaneous reading. At the same time where a Circular may be found to be contrary to the law, it may not compel a constitutional Court to enforce it against the law.

7. Considering the provision of section 6 of the Passports Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1967'), in Pawan Kumar Rajbhar (supra), the Court had the occasion to consider the interpretation to be given to the word 'proceeding' used in Section 6(2)(f) of the Act, 1967. In that regard, it was observed as below :

"20. To the extent the narrow construction of the word 'proceeding', under the Code may appear inadequate to administer the purpose of the Act, th