JUDGMENT

King, J. - This is a reference u/s 5, Court-fees Act, 1870.

2. The plaintiffs alleged that they were next reversioners of Moti Rawat deceased and that his widow was transferring the property without legal necessity and was committing acts of waste. They claimed the following reliefs : (a) A declaration that the plaintiffs are next reversioners. (b) A declaration that after the widow's death a certain deed of partition will not be binding upon the reversioners and that they will be owners of a certain grove. (c) A declaration that two alienations by the widow will not be binding upon the reversioners after the widow's death, (d) A receiver may be appointed for the management of certain property detailed in Schedule (a).

3. They valued the suit at Rs. 12,000 for the purposes of jurisdiction, but paid a fixed court-fee of Rs. 10 on each of the four reliefs, that is, a total of Rs. 40. No objection was taken to the insufficiency of court-fees in the trial Court.

4. The plaintiffs being unsuccessful in the trial Court have filed a first appeal in this Court, and the stamp reporter has taksn objection to the insufficiency of court-fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal. It is contended by the Taxing Officer that relief (d) for the appointment of receiver is a consequential relief and the suit falls u/s 7(4)(c), Court-fees Act, for the purpose of court-fee. It is further contended that as u/s 8, Suits Valuation Act, 1887, the value for the purposes of jurisdiction and the value for the purpose of the court-fee in a suit of this nature must be the same therefore the plaintiff-appellants must pay an ad valorem court-fee on the value stated in the plaint for the purpose of jurisdiction. It is however not suggested by the Taxing Officer that the ad valorem court-fee should be reckoned on the value of the whole suit for purposes of jurisdiction because the plaintiffs only ask that a receiver may be appointed in respect of a portion of the property, which is set forth in Schedule (a). This property has been valued at Rs. 3,280. It is suggested therefore that the ad valorem court-fee should be paid on Rs. 3,280.

5. The appellants challenge the contentions of the Taxing Officer, and several points arise for determination. The first question is whether relief (d) should be held to be a "consequential" relief within the meaning of Section 7(4)(c), Court-fees Act, or whether it should be held to be a separate and independent relief.

6. The appellants rely strongly upon the ruling of a single Judge of the Madras High Court in Karuppana Tevar v. Angammal AIR 1926 Mad. 678. This ruling relates to a suit by a reversioner for a declaration that an alienation by a Hindu widow is not binding on him, and for the appointment of a receiver to manage the property during the widow's lifetime. In that case it was held that the claim for the appointment of a receiver could not be held to be a consequential "relief as there was no connexion between the two reliefs. It was pointed out that the Court might refuse to grant the declaration and nevertheless might appoint a receiver. Conversely the Court might grant the declaration, and yet refuse to appoint a receiver. I think this ruling can be distinguished upon the facts. Reliefs (b) and (c) in the present suit are declarations that certain alienations made by the widow are not binding upon the reversioners. Relief (d), the appointment of a receiver, might be held to be quite separate and independent of those reliefs. Relief (a) however is a declaration of the plaintiffs' title as next reversioners, I think we may take it as certain that, unless the plaintiffs are able to establish their title as next reversioners, the Court will not grant the prayer for the appointment of a receiver. In hat sense therefore the appointment of a receiver may beheld to be a relief consequential," upon the granting of the declaration of the plaintiffs' title.

7. In a number of cases Courts have held that in suit