JUDGMENT

Braund, J. - This is an appeal by three men named Basdeo, Rupi and Sirya respectively, who have been charged, convicted and sentenced under Sections 147 and 323, coupled with Section 149, Penal Code. At the outset of the appeal, a preliminary point has been taken on behalf of the appellants. It is this. The two charges upon which the appellants have been tried were under Sections 323 and 147, Penal Code, respectively. A reference to Schedule 2, Criminal P.C. shows that each of these offences is what is known as a "warrant" case and is triable by "any Magistrate." In the present case the proceedings in their earlier stages came before the Special Magistrate of the first class of Muttra and he, on 14th March 1944, committed the present appellants to stand their trial before the Sessions Court of Muttra. At that stage it is necessary to say that the charges against these appellants were the outcome of one of those unfortunate affairs which so frequently happen and which give rise to cross-charges by and against two opposing parties of villagers, the substantial question being in each case as to which of them was the aggressor. This case was one of this kind; and, in addition to the charges against these appellants, the appellants themselves had made cross-charges against the complainants, which cross-charges u/s 304, Penal Code, had already been sent to the Sessions Court for trial. The learned Magistrate accordingly, for reasons which must be obvious enough, in his committing order said that, as there was a cross-case of the same date relating to the same dispute, he also committed the appellants to stand their trial in the same Sessions Court. Apart from any technicalities under the Criminal Procedure Code, that sounds reasonable enough.

2. What, however is said is that, inasmuch as the charges framed by the learned Magistrate against the appellants in this case were within the competence of the committing Magistrate himself, and the committing Magistrate expressed no opinion that the appellants could not be adequately punished by him, the committal to the Court of Session was bad in law u/s 254, Criminal P.C. That section provides that, after the hearing by the Magistrate of the evidence, he is to frame a charge in writing against the accused and to proceed to try them in all eases in which he is himself competent to try them and is of the opinion that an adequate punishment can be inflicted by him. That is a mandatory provision and amounts really to the direction of the Criminal Procedure Code that, unless the Magistrate holds the view that his powers of punishment are insufficient, he is bound to try those eases which are within his own jurisdiction, instead of sending them to the Sessions Court to be tried. In the present case the charges framed by the learned Magistrate were within his own competence to deal with, and his own powers of punishment were, so far as imprisonment was concerned, sufficient to cover the maximum sentences allowed by the relevant sections of the Penal Code. Moreover, in his committing order, the learned Magistrate did not purport to give as his reason for sending the matter to the Sessions Court any doubt as to his own power to inflict an adequate sentence. In all these circumstances it is contended on behalf of the appellants that their trial in the Sessions Court has been bad in law and that, apart from the merits of the case, they are entitled to have it set aside and, presumably, either to be acquitted or to have a retrial. Numerous authorities bearing on this matter have been referred to. In our own Court in Emperor v. Dharam Singh ('06) 3 A. L. J. 14 the late Sir George Knox in circumstances very similar to the present circumstances quashed a commitment to a Court of Session upon the ground that the committing Magistrate might himself have tried the case. To the same effect were the cases in 456, Emperor v. Bindeshri Goshain ('19) AIR 1919 All. 366 and Emperor Vs. Ram Jatan, AIR 1924 A