1981 Supreme(All) 1094
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
MURLIDHAR, J.
Jaikishan Dass - Appellant
Versus
K.G.K. College - Respondent
Second Appeal No. 3078 of 1972.
Decided On : 12-03-1981
Rajesh Kumar Agarwal and Raja Ram Agarwal, Advocates, for the Appellant; V. Sahai, B. Dayal and Standing Counsel, for the Respondents
JUDGMENT
Murlidhar, J. - The controversy in this second appeal is regarding 33 acres southern portion of plot No. 337 total area 1.41 acres which is alleged by the defendant-respondent K.G.K. College to have been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for the institution. The appeal arises out of a suit by the present appellants filed on 24-8-1961 for a declaration that they are owners in possession of the disputed land notwithstanding the land acquisition proceedings which allegedly did not affect their rights and for a permanent injunction restraining the institution from interference with the plaintiff's possession. By an amendment the relief of possession after demolition of any constructions made by the institution was also added. Both the Courts below have dismissed the suit.
2. The plaintiff's case in short was that they were the owners of plot No. 337 since long prior to abolition of Zamindari, that their father had constructed a temple and a number of quarters and shops in part of the plot and that they had been in possession of the whole plot, that they had learnt for the first time on 25-4-1956 that the land had been acquired for the college playing ground; that there had been no public notice in locality as required by Section 4 (1) Land Acquisition Act and nor did the plaintiff ever receive any notice about the said proceedings, and therefore, the proceedings were void and could not affect their rights. The defence case was that the plaintiff had no title and the land belonged to Gram Samaj the acquisition proceedings were valid and that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court held that the plaintiffs were the owners of the land in suit and the suit was within limitation as 12 years rule was applicable to a suit for possession. On the question of validity of land acquisition proceedings it held that public notice of the substance all notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act had not been given in the locality that individual notices to persons known or believed to be interested had not been served on the plaintiff and hence the proceedings were "fraudulent, illegal and ineffective". The Court also repelled the defendant's plea of estoppel. In first appeal the Civil Judge reversing the finding on the question of title held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish their title. On the question of limitation it held that the Collector had given an award on 22-2-1956 and possession of the acquired land had been taken on 25-4-56 and therefore, Article 14 of the Limitation Act prescribing a period of 1 year applied and the suit was barred by limitation. In view of these findings the lower appellate Court did not go to the question whether the land acquisition proceedings were invalid for want of public notice under Section 4 (1) and individual notices under Section 9. In second appeal only the three points of title, limitation, and invalidity of, the proceedings have been canvassed.
3. On the question of title, it is not disputed that initially Budhsen father of the plaintiff held the plot No. 337 and had constructed temple, quarters and shops in the remaining northern portion thereof which part is still in plaintiff's possession. The scale maps attached to the affidavit, counter-affidavit exchanged in second appeal (as the map filed in the trial Court was not traceable on record.) Show that approximately 54 metres northern portion of the plot is still in possession of the plaintiff or their transferees and has quarters, buildings and temples on it with open land also. But the southern approximately 34 metres (the width of both portions is approximately 73 metres) acquired for play ground is vacant. It is also not disputed that in the settlement of 1349 the whole plot was recorded as Abadi in the revenue papers. The lower appellate Court has accepted the defendant's contention that Abadi sites in villages vested in the Gram Samaj unless the same could be regarded as settled with the owner of