JUDGMENT

K. P. Singh, J. - By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed that for quashing the judgment of the revisional court dated 29.10.1987 whereby delay has been condoned and a direction has been issued to decide the claim of the parties on merits. It appears that an objection was filed by the contesting opposite parties under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act with a prayer for condonation of delay as is evident from annexure -2' attached to the writ petition. The consolidation officer through his judgment dated 16.4.1987 did not condone the delay and rejected the objection as is evident from annexure 7' to the writ petition/ Aggrieved by the order of the consolidation officer, the contesting opposite parties had preferred a revision petition which has been allowed and now the petitioners have approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the judgment of the revisional Court.

2. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners before me is that the consolidation officer was fully justified in rejecting the objection of the contesting opposite parties as barred by time and not condoning the delay of five years, as no sufficient cause was shown. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the revisional court has acted illegally and arbitrarily in interfering with the order of the Consolidation Officer without any ground.

3. Learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted in reply that only delay has been condoned by the impugned order and the parties have been afforded opportunity to contest their case on merits. Therefore, it is not a lit case where any interference should be made with the impugned judgment.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the ruling reported in Chamba Singh v. State of U.P. and others, (1974 RD 144) and has emphasised that the claim of the contesting opposite parties being not good on merit, there is no case for condonation of delay. The Consolidation Officer had lightly rejected the claim of the contesting opposite parties and the revisional court has mainly allowed the claim of the contesting opposite parties on the ground that its claim was good on merit. The revisional court has failed to record categorical finding on question of sufficiency of cause for delay. Therefore, the impugned judgment should be quashed. He has also invited my attention to the ruling reported in Shanti Prasad Gupta v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut and others, (1981 (supplement) Supreme Court Cases page 73) and has emphasised the following observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 3 :

"... .Whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay, is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case and the proposition is well settled that when the order has been made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the lower appellate court in exercise of its discretion allowing or rejecting the application to explain time, it cannot be interfered with in a revision unless the lower court has acted with material irregularity or contrary to law or has come to the conclusion at no evidence."

5. In the present case, it has been emphasised that the revisonal court has not given any cogent reasons for interfering with the discretion exercised by the consolidation officer and, therefore, the impugned judgment should be quashed.

6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has emphasised before me that under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, the revisional court enjoys very wide power and it can interfere with the improper order passed by the subordinate authority. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the revisional court was fully justified in interfering with the order of the consolidation officer when the contesting opposite parties were not served with the notice of the relevant proceedings. My attention has b