The court held that complaints under the Sexual Harassment Act must follow established procedural rules, and if norms of natural justice are breached, the recommendations may be invalid despite alternative appeal mechanisms existing.

JUDGMENT :

MANISH MATHUR, J.

1. Heard Mr. Shireesh Kumar, learned counsel for petitioner and learned State counsel for opposite parties no.1 to 6.

1A. Supplementary affidavit filed today is taken on record.

2. Liberty is granted to petitioner to implead the complainant as opposite party no.7 during the course of day.

3. Issue notice to newly impleaded opposite party no.7.

4. Petition has been filed challenging recommendations dated 01.08.2025 submitted in terms of Section 13 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013.

5. At the very outset, Mr. Sandeep Sharma, learned State Counsel has raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of this petition in view of the fact that recommendations submitted in terms of Section 13 of the Act of 2013 are appealable and therefore, petitioner has an alternative and equally efficacious remedy for filing appeal before the Authority concerned in terms of Section 18 of the Act read with Rule 11 of the Rules framed thereunder.

6. In rebuttal thereof, learned counsel for petitioner submits that Section 18 of the Act of 2013 indicates that primarily an appeal is required to be preferred to the Court or Tribunal concerned in accordance with provisions of Service Rules applicable to the said person and it is only where such Rules do not exist then an appeal is required to be preferred in such manner as may be prescribed. It is submitted that petitioner being a Government Servant, the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 are applicable upon him but do not indicate any Court or Tribunal as an Appellate Authority and therefore in such circumstances, the benefit of appeal would not be applicable to petitioner since the U.P. State Public Services Tribunal does not have any power of jurisdiction under the Act under which it was constituted to entertain appeals against recommendations made under Section 13 of the Act of 2013.

7. It has been submitted that in such a situation, recourse may be taken to provisions of appeal under Rule 11 of the Rules of 2013 but refer to the aspect of preferring an appeal to the Appellate Authority notified under clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Learned counsel has thereafter adverted to the aforesaid Act of 1946 to submit that the Appellate Authority under Section 2 thereof means an authority appointed by the appropriate Government in respect of Industrial Establishments under the control of Central Government or Railway Administration or in a major port, mine and for which, it is the Central Government which is the appropriate Authority and in all other cases, it is the State Government.

8. Learned counsel has also drawn attention to definition of ‘Industrial Establishment’ defined under Section 2(e) of the Act of 1946 to submit that the petitioner would not come within purview of any of the Industrial Establishments as indicated therein. He has also adverted to the notification dated 04.05.2016 issued by the Ministry of Labour and Employment, New Delhi in terms of Rule 11 of the Rules of 2013 to submit that the said notification is only with regard to Central Government Employees whereas petitioner is a State Government Employee and therefore in terms thereof, no such Rules having been