Statutory arbitration under the National Highways Act is governed by the Arbitration Act, and any delay allegations must be addressed exclusively in civil court, not via writ petitions.

JUDGMENT

(Per: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, J.)

1. Heard learned counsels for the petitioners, Sri Pranjal Mehrotra, Sri Raghav Dwivedi and Sri Devendra Kumar, learned counsels for the respondent-National Highway Authority of India, Sri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents and Sri Paras Nath Rai, learned Senior Counsel for the Union of India.

1.1. Since all the aforesaid writ petitions involve a common legal issue concerning the maintainability of writ petitions seeking mandamus for time-bound disposal of arbitration proceedings under Section 3G(5) of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , 1956¹ [The Act, 1956] and the applicability of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act and Conciliation, 1996² [The Arbitration Act, 1996] to such statutory arbitrations, and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the petitions have been clubbed together, heard analogously, and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

A. PRAYER:

2. All the above-mentioned writ petitions have been preferred for a direction to the respondent - Arbitrator to decide the respective cases of the petitioners within a time bound period.

B. FACTS OF THE CASE:-

3. For the purpose of brevity, only the facts of the leading writ petition, i.e. WRIT - C No. 28215 of 2025, are being discussed in detail hereinbelow.

3.1. The petitioner of the leading writ petition is the recorded owner of several parcels of land situated in Mauja Bagahi Bhari, Tappa Bharivasi, Pargana Haveli, Tehsil Campiorganj, District Gorakhpur, bearing Arazi No.46 (0.075 hectare), Arazi No.169 (0.1082 hectare) and Arazi No.269 (0.5747 hectare). These lands were acquired by the respondents for the purposes of the Bharat Mala Scheme relating to the widening and extension of National Highway No.29E (presently renumbered as NH- 24) from Sunauli Jungle Kaudiya to Gorakhpur. In connection with this acquisition, the competent authority, i.e., the Special Land Acquisition Officer (respondent no.4), issued a government notice on 14.07.2022 anda revised notice on 06.03.2023. As the compensation assessed for his land was arbitrarily fixed at an unreasonably low rate and he was neither paid compensation nor informed of the basis of assessment, the petitioner filed a claim petition under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 before the Arbitrator/District Magistrate, Gorakhpur (respondent no.3) on 17.05.2023. Despite more than two years having elapsed, the said claim petition, registered as Case No.1176 of 2023 (Computer Case No.D202305310001176), has not been decided. Aggrieved by the inaction and delay in adjudication of his claim, the petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court seeking a direction to respondent no.3 - Arbitrator to decide his claim petition expeditiously within a time-bound period.

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS:

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the entire acquisition process undertaken by the respondents is vitiated for non-compliance of mandatory provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013³ [The Act, 2013]. It is argued that the notices dated 14.07.2022 and 06.03.2023 were issued mechanically, without following due procedure, and hence cannot be sustained. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner’s right to property under Article 300-A of the Constitution has been infringed by acquiring his land without proper notice and without payment of lawful compensation. Moreover, once the petitioner had invoked arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956, it became the statutory obligation of the Arbitrator/District Magistrate to decide the claim within a reasonable time. The unexplained delay of over two years, during which the matter has been adjourned repeatedly without progress, is arbitrary, unjust and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. It is contended that “speedy justice” is an integral part of the right to l