Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2026 Supreme(All) 565

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LAKSHMI KANT SHUKLA, J.
Ajay Kumar – Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. and Another – Respondents
Criminal Revision No. 2404 of 2025
Decided On : 15-05-2026

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellants : Satyaveer Singh, Yawar Mukhtar
For the Respondent: Santosh Kumar Shukla

The court maintains wide discretionary power under the criminal procedure code to summon or admit documents at any stage of trial, provided the court independently determines that such material is essential for reaching a just decision and is not being used to unfairly fill a lacuna.

Headnote:(A) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 91 - Power of Court - Production of document or other thing - Scope of - Whether court can accept documents at final argument stage - Held, Court has wide discretionary power to summon or permit production of any document at any stage of inquiry or trial, provided such production is considered necessary or desirable for just decision of case - Power must be exercised judiciously to ensure truth and not to fill lacuna or prejudice accused. (Paras 11, 13, 17)

(B) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Sections 91 and 311 - Comparative analysis - Section 311 pertains to summoning or recalling witnesses, whereas Section 91 provides for summoning production of documents - Both provisions confer broad powers on court to ensure fair and just proceedings, allowing for applications to be moved by either party provided court independently satisfies itself regarding necessity. (Paras 11, 12, 14, 15)

Facts of the case:
An order passed by the trial court allowing the introduction of additional documents and applications after the closure of prosecution evidence, recording of accused statements, and commencement of final arguments was challenged. The contention was that such late-stage admission of evidence is beyond the scope of procedural law and prejudiced the defence.

Findings of Court:
The court held that Section 91 Cr.P.C. provides for the production of documents at any stage of the trial if such production is deemed necessary or desirable. The court is not precluded from entertaining an application from a party, but it must exercise its discretion cautiously, ensuring that the evidence is germane to the issues and essential for reaching a just decision, rather than merely filling gaps in the prosecution's case.

Issues: The main issues were whether a court possesses the jurisdiction to accept additional documents after the closure of evidence and final argument stage, and whether an application for such production by a party is legally maintainable under the criminal procedure framework.

Ratio Decidendi: The court maintained that the statutory power under Section 91 is wide enough to facilitate the discovery of truth. The exercise of this power is not restricted by the stage of the proceedings, provided the court acts with caution and circumspection, ensuring the evidence assists in a fair trial and does not lead to miscarriage of justice or unfair prejudice against the accused.

Result: Revision dismissed.

Table of Content
1. procedural context for revision of trial court orders. (Para 1 , 2 , 3)
2. conflict over the admissibility of evidence post-closure of proceedings under crpc. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 16)
3. statutory interpretation of court powers under sections 91 and 311 crpc for producing evidence. (Para 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 17 , 18)
4. formal court order regarding the dismissal of the criminal revision. (Para 19)

JUDGMENT :

LAKSHMI KANT SHUKLA, J.

1. Heard Mr. Mukhtar Alam, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Yawar Mukhtar, learned counsel for the revisionist, Mr. Satendra Tiwari, learned A.G.A. representing the State opposite party no. 1 and Mr. Santosh Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2.

2. Perused the record.

3. Revisionist Ajay Kumar has approached this Court by means of the present Criminal Revision challenging the impugned order dated 10.03.2025 passed by the Special Judge (D.A.A.), Firozabad (hereinafter referred to as "the Trial Court") in Special Session Case No. 136 of 2009, State v. Ajay and others , whereby the applications along with other documents filed by the informant/opposite party no. 2 has been accepted.

4. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the present criminal revision has been filed on the ground that the impugned order is illegal, arbitrary and beyond the jurisdiction of the Trial Court. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure enabling the Court to accept documentary evidence after closure of evidence, particularly when no reason has been assigned by the Trial Court.

5. Elaborating his submission, it is urged that in the concerned matter the evidence of prosecution was over, statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. of accused persons had already been recorded and even statement of D.W.-1 had also been recorded and the case was fixed for final argument but in the mean time, the application 59 Ba along with few papers through list 60 Ba, an application 55 Ba along with list 56 Ba was presented before the Court without any provision and the same was accepted.

6. To buttress his submission, learned counsel for the revisionist relied upon the judgement of Delhi High Court in Rajesh Kumar Singh and others v. Lokpal of India in W.P. (C) No. 1264 of 2025 dated 28.11.2025, where the Delhi High Court relying on its judgement in Mujahat Ali Khan v. Lokpal of India , 2025 DHC 9986 (DB), in paragraph 23 held as under:

"23. We are of the considered view that the protections embedded in the Lokpal Act occupy a central and indispensable position, and the statute must be implemented strictly in the manner mandated by Parliament. This principle stands unequivocally affirmed not only by binding judicial precedents but also by the very framework and legislative scheme of the Lokpal Act. The importance of these statutory safeguards, which have a direct bearing on the issues arising in the present case, is clearly examined in the judgement of this Court in Mujahat Ali Khan v. Lokpal of India , 2025 DHC 9986 (DB). The relevant excerpts of the said Judgement are reproduced herein below for ready reference:

"37. The statutory framework of Section 20 leaves no room for doubt that the requirement of affording an opportunity of hearing at the pre- investigation stage as well as at the post- investigation stage is mandatory. Section 20(3) explicitly provides that the learned Lokpal "shall" after giving an opportunity of being heard to the concerned public servant, decide whether a prima facie case exists and thereafter proceed to direct an investigation.

38. The legislative intent in this regard is further evident from the structure of Section 20 itself. Even at the stage of Section 20(1), where the Lokpal decides to direct an investigation, as distinguished from ordering a preliminary inquiry under Section 20(1)(a), the third proviso thereof mandates that before such investigation is ordered, the Lokpal "shall" call for the explanat