The judgment emphasizes the importance of careful scrutiny of evidence before summoning the accused and the limitations of the court's jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC.

JUDGMENT :

The present applicants have been summoned, to be tried for the offences under Sections 354(A), 323, 452, 504 and 506 of IPC in a Criminal Case No. 299 of 2022, State Vs. Pradeep Verma and others, wherein they have been summoned by the learned Court of Judicial Magistrate, Dwarahat, District Almora by an order dated 18.08.2022. The challenge has also been given to the Chargesheet No. 3 of 2021 dated 29.12.2021.

2. In fact, the attempt, which has been made by the learned counsel for the applicants while addressing upon the C482 Application is, as if he wanted this Court to appreciate the evidence and the statement which has been recorded by the witnesses under Section 161 of CrPC, in order to make out a case that no offence, for which the present applicants have been summoned, is made out. On the contrary, he has also argued and pleaded, that the summoning order, as issued by the learned Court of Judicial Magistrate, Dwarahat, District Almora in Criminal Case No. 299 of 2022, State Vs. Pradeep Verma and others, is without application of mind and for that purposes, he has drawn the attention of this Court to the pleadings raised in para 21 of the C482 Application and also has made reference to the judgment of M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, as reported in 1998 (5) SCC 749, particularly the reference has been made to para 28 of the said judgment, which is extracted hereunder:-

“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.”

3. The basic implication and purpose of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, while recording its observations in para 28 of the said judgment was, that when learned trial Court when it takes cognizance for summoning of an accused person to face a criminal trial, the Court has to apply its mind and assign reasons for summoning of an accused person. Assigning of reasons for summoning of an accused person, does not entail a detailed deliberation or a finding which is required to be recorded in relation to the evidences, which were adduced by the parties and particularly, after consideration of the statements recorded under Section 161 of CrPC, which has been attempted to be argued by the learned counsel for the applicants.

4. The basic intention and purpose of the ratio laid down in para 28 of the judgment of M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd (supra) was that before putting the criminal proceedings into motion, the persons thus intended to be summoned may not be harassed upon an unnecessary litigation because summoning of the accused person will always have its correlative affect of his prestige in the society, and as such, that is the precaution which is intended to be taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court, that the Court ought to apply its mind before an accused is summoned to face a criminal trial.

5. As per the opinion of this Court, in order to meet out the said limitation of summoning of an accused person, as contemplated in para 28 of t