The main legal point established in the judgment is the necessity of assigning reasons for granting interim orders and the principle of protecting the lis to be decided on merits.

JUDGMENT :

The applicant to the present C482 Application has agitated his grievance as against the impugned order dated 06.09.2023, as it has been passed in Criminal Revision No. 126 of 2023, Siddhartha Batra and others Vs. State of Uttarakhand and others. The grievance of the applicant, first of all, it is as against an interlocutory order, whereby the Revisional Court, while entertaining the Revision as against allowing of an application under Section 156(3) of CrPC has granted an interim order, staying the effect and operation of the order dated 05.09.2023.

2. Primarily, the argument of the learned counsel for the applicants is on the basis of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, as rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, whereby in those proceedings, the Hon’ble Apex Court was dealing with the interim order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (ST) No. 2306 of 2020, whereby the Court was scrutinizing the interim order which was rendered in the said case to the following effect:

“no coercive measures shall be adopted”.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant, while referring to para 14 of the said judgment has contended that the Courts which are exercising their inherent powers either under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when they are granting interim order or even while exercising the revisional powers under Section 397 has had to assign reasons for granting the interim order and that is what has been attempted to be extracted from the contents of para 14, which is extracted hereunder:-

“14. A similar view has been expressed by this Court again in the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited (supra). By deprecating the interlocutory orders/stay of criminal proceedings by the High Courts, it is observed by this Court that the stay should not be considered as an incentive to cause delay in the proceedings. It is further observed that order granting stay or extending it must be a speaking order and stay not to operate long. It is further observed in the said decision that delay in a criminal trial has deleterious effect on the administration of justice in which the society has a vital interest; delay in trials affects the faith in Rule of Law and efficacy of the legal system; it affects social welfare and development; mere prima facie case is not enough; party seeking stay must be put to terms and stay should not be incentive to delay; the order granting stay must show application of mind; the power to grant stay is coupled with accountability. It is further observed that wherever stay is granted, a speaking order must be passed showing that the case was of an exceptional nature.”

4. The learned counsel for the applicant has pressed the C482 Application on two grounds that the impugned interim order is without assigning any reasons, secondly, it was on account of the influence exercised by the revisionist who is a sitting MLA.

5. First of all, as far as the arguments extended by the learned counsel for the applicant from the view point, that since the interim order was granted because the revisionist therein being a sitting MLA, is absolutely a preposterous argument extended by the learned counsel for the applicants because even being an elected members of legislative assembly, doesn’t deprive a person to approach the Court for redressal of his or her grievance as against the impugned orders which are passed by the trial against him or her.

6. The expression of that the revisionist is a sitting MLA has been only attracted in his arguments to give colours to the C482 Application and particularly in order to have its persuasive value before this Court while giving a challenge to an interlocutory order.

7. Even otherwise also, in accordance with the provisions contained under Section 397 of CrPC, when the revisional jurisdiction is