Writ petitions under Article 227 challenging arbitrator's rejection of compensation enhancement applications under National Highways Act on limitation grounds held not maintainable due to alternative statutory remedy under Section 34 of Arbitration Act.

JUDGMENT :

Rakesh Thapliyal, J.

1. In all these bunch of writ petitions preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, common question of law and facts are involved, therefore, all the writ petitions are being heard and decided together by this common judgment. Writ Petition No. 534 of 2025 is being treated to be leading one.

2. In all these writ petitions, petitioners are challenging the order passed by the Arbitrator /Collector, Udham Singh Nagar, whereby applications preferred by petitioners under Section 3 (G) (5) of the National Highway Act, 1956 has been rejected at the admission stage on the ground of limitation. Admittedly, land of the petitioners were acquired for widening of NH 74 from Kashipur to Sitarganj from 175 km. to 252 km and the Competent Authority / Special Land Acquisition Officer i.e. respondent no. 1 herein has passed an Award on 27.04.2015 followed by Supplementary Award dated 20.01.2017.

3. Case of the petitioners are that due to financial constraints and lack of legal knowledge Award could not be challenged within time and subsequently, after arranging the fund, the application was filed under Section 3 (G) (5) of the National Highway Act after seven years of the Award. The aforesaid application was rejected by the order impugned without going into the merit of the case on the ground that the same is barred by limitation and while rejecting the application, the Arbitrator in its order impugned take note of the fact that no application was moved for condoning the delay since the contention of the applicant was that the provision of Limitation Act are not applicable and observed even assuming that the provision of Limitation Act are not applicable even then period of limitation would be 3 years as provided under Article 137 of Limitation Act and as such at a belated stage of i.e. after 7 years the application cannot be allowed.

4. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that order impugned is bad in the eyes of law since the provision of Limitation Act are not applicable and is liable to be set aside.

5. The moot question raised in these petitions are on two folds:

“(i) Whether the Arbitrator was right in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Section 3 (G) (5) of the National Highway Act, 1956 on the ground of limitation more particularly under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

(ii) Whether Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the Arbitrator who is deciding the application under Section 3 (G) (5) of the National Highway Act, 1956 in capacity of the quasi judicial body.”

6. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that learned Arbitrator while passing the impugned order has not considered Section 2 (4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which reads as under:

“2 (4) This Part except sub-section (1) of section 40, sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except in so far as the provisions of this Part are inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder.”

7. By referring the aforesaid provision, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that Section 2 (4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, shows that Section 43 which talks about limitation is not applicable to arbitration under any other enactment as the case in hand. of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is read as under:

“Limitations.—(1) The Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall apply