ORDER

1. This writ petition has been filed by petitioner Smt. Summi Bai being aggrieved by an order dated 25.2.2020 (Annexure P-9) passed by the Commissioner, Jabalpur Division, Jabalpur in the capacity as Arbitrator under section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short "the 1956 Act").

2. The Commissioner, by the aforesaid order, has dismissed the application filed by the petitioner under section 3G(5) of the 1956 Act, questioning the correctness of quantum of compensation awarded by the Competent Authority-cum-Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Jabalpur and praying for enhancement of the same. The learned Commissioner has held that the award was passed on 19.12.2014 and as per Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, limitation for filing of such application would be three years. Since the application has been filed before the Arbitrator on 6.9.2018 therefore, it was time barred by nine months.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the two Division Bench decisions of this Court in WP No.20609/2016 (Lal Singh v. The Union of India) decided on 21.12.2016 and WP No.692/2017 (Gourishanker v. The Commissioner) decided on 17.1.2017, to contend that in similar circumstances, the matter has been remanded to the Commissioner for consideration on merit.

4. In Lal Singh's case (supra), the Division Bench of this Court held as under :-

"It is well settled principle of law that when an authority is bestowed with statutory power to take a decision in the matter and when a decision is taken either dismissing the application for want of prosecution or on technical grounds an inherent power is always available with the authority for restoration of the proceedings and deciding the application on merits. We find that in various cases that are coming before us, the statutory authority exercising power under section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 are in the habit of dismissing the appeals on technical grounds of limitation or want of prosecution. The National Highways Act, 1956 and the provisions contained therein for award of the compensation and the provisions for an appeal against the award of the Land Acquisition Officer is a benevolent peace (sic) of legislature formulated under the social welfare concept prescribed in the constitution. These legislations have been enacted for the benefit of a land owner who is deprived of the right to use the land and to seek adequate compensation. In such cases, the appellate authority should be more sensitive to the requirement of the land oustee and instead of dismissing the appeals on technical grounds of limitation or want of prosecution should adopt a justice oriented approach and try to dispose of the appeals on merit after considering various aspects of the matter. We do not appreciate the trend of the appellate authority exercising statutory jurisdiction under section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 dismissing the appeals on the grounds of limitation or on account of want of prosecution. We may take judicial notice of the fact that every day we find 3 or 4 cases coming up for hearing where the authorities have dismissed the application for want of prosecution or on grounds of limitation. That being so, we direct the Chief Secretary of the State Government to take note of this order, circulate it to the appellate authorities, namely, the Commissioners of various Revenue Divisions and to emphasize upon them the requirement of deciding the appeals on merit instead of following the process of dismissing them on technical grounds."

In Gourishanker's case (supra), it was held, thus :

"Challenging an order dated 16.1.2016 passed by the appellate authority exercising the powers of an arbitrator under section 3G(5) of National Highways Act and rejecting an appeal on the ground of delay, this writ petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Compensation was determined by the Land Acquisition Officer and an award passed on 13t