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1960 Supreme(MP) 264

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
Shiv Dayal, J.
MAGHANAMAL NARUMAL - Appellant
Versus
MOOLCHAND GIANCHAND - Respondents
Civil Revn. 160 Of 1958
Decided On : 09/08/1960

Advocates Appeared:
Batham, Dulani

A Tribunal constituted under Section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 is a civil court and, therefore, revision lies under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Headnote:

DISPLACED PERSONS (DEBTS ADJUSTMENT) ACT, 1951 - SECTION 4, 5, 10, 11, 25, 36, 40 - TRIBUNAL - CIVIL COURT - REVISION - LIMITATION ACT, 1908 - ARTICLE 57 - DISPLACED PERSONS (INSTITUTION OF SUITS) ACT, 1948 - SECTION 3, 8 - DISPLACED PERSONS (INSTITUTION OF SUITS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS) AMENDMENT ACT, 1950 - SECTION 3 - TRIBUNAL UNDER THE ACT IS A CIVIL COURT - REVISION LIES UNDER SECTION 115, C. P. C. - CLAIM BARRED BY LIMITATION - NO BENEFIT OF EXTENSION OF LIMITATION UNDER SECTION 36 OF THE ACT.

Fact of the Case:

Maghanmal applied to the Tribunal constituted under Section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (1951 Act) for adjustment of his debts. Mulchand, a creditor, made a separate application under Section 10 of the 1951 Act making a claim of Rs. 5,500/- against Maghanmal. The Tribunal held that a sum of Rs. 3600/- was due by Maghanmal to Mulchand on account of two transactions and that the claim was within limitation because they were 'deposits'. Maghanmal filed a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C. P. C.) challenging the Tribunal's decision.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the Tribunal constituted under Section 4 of the 1951 Act is a civil court and, therefore, revision lies under Section 115 of the C. P. C. The court further held that Mulchand's claim was barred by limitation as the period of limitation for both the claims had become barred by time on the 4th and the 19th August, 1950, and the benefit of the extension of limitation under the 1948 Act or the 1951 Act was not available to him.

Issues: 1. Whether the Tribunal constituted under Section 4 of the 1951 Act is a civil court and, therefore, revision lies under Section 115 of the C. P. C.? 2. Whether Mulchand's claim was barred by limitation?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the Tribunal constituted under Section 4 of the 1951 Act is a civil court and, therefore, revision lies under Section 115 of the C. P. C. The court relied on the following factors: * The Tribunal is appointed by the State Government under Section 4 of the Act. * The Tribunal is required to follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure under Section 25 of the Act. * The Tribunal has the power to pass decrees and orders and execute them under Section 28 of the Act. * Appeals lie from the Tribunal's decrees and orders under Section 40 of the Act. 2. The court held that Mulchand's claim was barred by limitation as the period of limitation for both the claims had become barred by time on the 4th and the 19th August, 1950, and the benefit of the extension of limitation under the 1948 Act or the 1951 Act was not available to him.

Final Decision: The court allowed the revision and set aside the Tribunal's judgment and order holding Maghanmal liable to pay to Mulchand a sum of Rs. 3600/-.

SHIV DAYAL, J.

( 1 ) THIS revision arises out of proceedings under Section 5 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, No. 70 of 1951 (hereinafter called the 1951 Act ).

( 2 ) MAGHANMAL applied on 9-9-1952, to the Tribunal constituted under Section 4 of the 1951 Act for adjustment of his debts. In the list of creditors he mentioned the name of Mulchand with the remark that the owed him nothing still he (Mulchand) demanded repayment of an alleged loan. Other creditors are not concerned with this revision.

( 3 ) MULCHAND had made a separate application under Section 10 of the 1951 Act making a claim of Rs. 5,500/- against Maghanmal. On 1-5-1953, that petition was dismissed on the ground that Maghanmal had already filed a petition under Section 5 of the Act. Thereupon, on 16-9-1953, Mulchand made an application to the Tribunal in Maghanmal's case, for the determination of his debt. Maghanmal resisted Mulchand's claim. Shri S. L. Chopta, learned Civil Judge First Class, acting as the tribunal constituted) under Section 4 of the Act, held that a sum of Rs. 3600/- was due by Maghanmal to Mulchand on account of two transactions and that the claim was within limitation because they were 'deposits'.

( 4 ) AGGRIEVED by it, Maghanmal filed this revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the subject matter in dispute is less than Rs. 5000/-, so that he could not prefer an appeal (Section 41 of the Act ).

( 5 ) SHRI Batham raises a preliminary objection as to the competence of this revision. Learned counsel lays stress on the expression "court subordinate" to the High Court. Relying on Sunder Das v. Lachman Das, AIR 1957 All 352, it is argued that the tribunal under Section 4 of the Act is not a court subordinate to the High Court and this Court, has, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere in revision with any order of the tribunal.

( 6 ) IN Section 4 of the 1951 Act, authority to exercise jurisdiction under it is given to the "tribunal or Tribunals". In the new set up and with the development of social, economic and political ideas many a right have to be recognized which formerly were not subject matters of 'lis'. The policy of the State has been to create special tribunals for their enforcement. In Bharat Bank v. Their Employees, 1950 SCR 459 : (AIR 1950 SC 188), Mukherjee J. observed that "owing to the intricate and complicated system of Government that exists in a modern State and the vast extension of social legislation of all sort, the so called administrative and quasi-judicial tribunals have come to be a permanent feature of our social and political system. They function as adjudicating bodies in disputes concerning large number of economic and social affairs. . . . . The question is what are the tests or distinguishing features, which disassociate an administrative tribunal from a Court of law".

( 7 ) ORIGINALLY the term "court" meant, among other meanings, the Sovereign's palace. It has acquired the meaning of the place where justice is administered and, further has come to mean the persons who exercise judicial functions under authority derived either immediately or mediately from the Sovereign. All tribunals, however, are not courts. (Halsbury's Laws of England (Salmond Edition) at page 342 ).

( 8 ) SOME of the Authorities or Tribunals constituted under special Acts take evidence on oath, act in a judicial manner and pronounce upon valuable rights. They may or may not be civil courts. The line of demarcation between administrative tribunals and Courts of Civil judicature is difficult to be drawn. It was observed) by Lord Sankey K. C. in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioners of Taxation, 1931 AC 275 :

"the authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. . . . . In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on the subject: (1) A tribuna
































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