( 1 ) THIS Full Bench has been constituted to decide the following question referred by Hon. Vijaywargiya. J. in Civil Second Appeal No. 422 of 1979: "whether a ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) of the Act, which was not in existence at the time of the filing of the suit but came into existence during the pendency of the suit can be made a ground for eviction by amendment of the plaint and whether a decree for eviction can be passed on such ground?"

( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this reference; briefly are as follows:-- During the pendency of the suit for eviction, the plaintiff-respondents filed an application for leave to amend the plaint by claiming the relief of eviction on an additional ground specified in Section 12 (1) (h) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 196l (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), that the suit accommodation was also required for reconstruction, which could not be done without evicting the defendant-tenant from the leased premises. The application for amendment was allowed by the trial Court, but on appeal, the Appellate Court relying upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ratanlal Gulzarilal Vaishya v. Damodardas Girdharilal Vaishya (1961 MPLJ 7) reversed that order. In the second appeal, it was urged before the learned single Judge, on behalf of the respondents, that the Appellate Court had committed an error in rejecting the application for amendment. Reliance was placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sunderlal Hazarilal v. Har Prasad (1980 MPLJ 182 ). The learned single Judge felt that there was an apparent conflict in the two Division Bench decisions of this Court in 1961 MPLJ 7 (supra) and 1980 MPLJ 182 (supra ). That is how the aforesaid question came to be referred to this Full Bench.

( 3 ) TO answer the question referred to us, it would be necessary to consider whether a ground for eviction under a Rent Act, can be held to be a part of the cause of action. Some courts have taken the view that grounds of ejectment are not a part of cause of action in a suit for ejectment (see Zainab Bai v. Navayug Chitrapat Co. Ltd. (AIR 1969 Bom 194) and Premlal v. Jadavchand (AIR 1979 Raj 44), But after the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Animal (AIR 1979 SC 1745), it is clear that determination of lease in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and that making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant is by itself sufficient. It cannot (now) be taken to be well-settled that a ground of eviction under the Rent Act constitutes a cause of action.

( 4 ) THE next question that arises for consideration is whether a plaintiff can by way of amendment to the plaint, add a cause of action which came into existence during the pendency of the suit. As observed by the Privy Council in Ma. Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung (AIR 1922 PC 249), all rules of Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of Justice, and it is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised. Rules of procedure as laid down by the Supreme Court in Jai Jai Ram Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon (AIR 1969 SC 2267) are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of Justice. It is true that Courts have declined to allow amendments when by permitting the amendment, injustice may result to the other side. The ultimate test, as observed by Batchelor, J. in Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant (1909) ILR 33 Bom 644, is can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the otherside? This observation of Batchelor. J. has been approved by the Supreme Court in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil (AIR 1957 SC 363 ). Therefore, it is in the light of this test that we have to consider as to whether by per