A widow who has been in possession of her husband's property since his death is deemed to have acquired absolute ownership of the property by prescription under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and she is entitled to sell the property.

( 1 ) THIS appeal is by defendant No. 1 (since deceased) whose sale deed dated 10-1-1963 (Ex. D/22) has been declared not binding on plaintiff Shiv Singh and who is injuncted permanently from interfering with plaintiffs ownership and possession of the property covered by the sale deed. The sale deed was executed by defendant No. 2 and the decree bound her also, but during the trial of the suit, she expired and in this appeal, her adopted son, Vijay Singh, is impleaded as respondent No. 2.

( 2 ) THE suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted on 17-8-1964 and occasion evidently was provided by judgment rendered on 7-2-1964 by this Court in Second Appeal No. 140 of 1963 in which late Janki Bai, defendant No. 2, was arrayed as respondent No. 2. That appeal arose out of a suit instituted by the appellant late Bapu Saheb Tomak, father of plaintiff Shiv Singh. Be it mentioned, however, that during the pendency of the instant appeal Shiv Singh also died. But, it is also noteworthy that even during his lifetime, he was not interested is presenting the suit and as such, defendant No. 6 Harish Chandra (herein respondent No. 7) secured an order from this Court under which he was allowed to conduct the suit. There is no doubt that he has acquired interest pendente lite in the suit property in virtue of an agreement of sale thereof executed in his favour by plaintiff Shiv Singh on 18-2-1968. As in the Court below, here also the contest is mainly between defendant No. 1 Dharmavati (since deceased) and defendant respondent Harish Chandra.

( 3 ) IN Civil Suit No. 25 of 1962, giving rise to aforesaid Second Appeal No. 140 of 1963, plaintiff Bapu Saheb, Shiv Singh's father, had sued the State Government for recovery of rent for the period from 26-9-1948 to 23-3-1968 in respect of the suit premises and in that suit Janki Bai was impleaded as defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1, State Government, pleaded that it was prepared to pay rent for the suit premises on entitlement to receive that rent being settled by Court by deciding the contest between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2. Among others, the following two issues were framed in that suit :" (3) Whether defendant No. 1 is tenant of the plaintiff and he (plaintiff) is entitled to collect rent? (4) Whether the plaintiff was entrusted with the arrangement of the Sansthan included the disputed house and no right of ownership was transferred to him?"both issues were decided in favour of defendant No. 2 and she was held entitled to receive rent from the State Government for the suit premises. The decision of the trial Court was eventually confirmed in the Second Appeal and this Court confirmed the finding of the lower appellate Court that Bapu Saheb Tamek was her agent only and entitlement to receive the rent for suit premises was that of Janki Bai. In taking that view, the Court below and also this Court in Second Appeal, relied on the decision of the Council of Regency which is also proved in this case as Ex. P/ 2. That decision was rendered on 17-11-1930.

( 4 ) IN this appeal, the main contention raised to assail validity of the decree is based on the plea of res judicata with respect to the decision aforesaid in civil suit No. 85 of 1962, confirmed in Second Appeal No. 140 of 1963 (Ex. D/6 ). However, in my view, it is necessary dehors that plea, to determine if the decree in its two parts is otherwise valid. In other words, the questions to be decided in this appeal are - (a) whether the plaintiff has proved his ownership and possession of the suit premises; and (b) whether defendant Dharmavati Bai could be validly injuncted and her sale deed dated 10-1-1963 could be validly cancelled. Both questions undoubtedly are mixed questions of law and facts.

( 5 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that if the second question is decided is appellant's favour, it would not be necessary to decide the first question. Accordingly, it has to be determined as f