The market value of the immovable property is the criterion for pecuniary jurisdiction and valuation for court-fee purposes under the Court-fees Act and Suits Valuation Act.

( 1 ) THIS is a revision by the plaintiff against order dated 8-9-2001 of the 1st Additional District Judge Sidhi in Civil Suit No. 22-A of 2000 by which he has been directed to value the suit for purposes of Court-fee at Rs. 82,500/- and pay ad valorem Court-fee.

( 2 ) THE relevant averments in the plaint are that the defendant No. 1 granted sub-lease of a portion of the plot shown in red colour in the plaint map to the plaintiff by lease deed dated 29-7-1995 and placed him in possession thereof; the plaintiff is in possession of this land and has raised some construction thereon; the defendant No. 1 has got surrender deed dated 31-12-1999 in respect of this land registered in his favour in which a consideration of R. 85,500/- has been shown the plaintiff has not signed on this deed and he is not a party to it; it is forged and the defendant No. 1 is threatening to dispossess the plaintiff from that plot. The plaintiff has claimed the relief of declaration that the said surrender deed is void and of permanent injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession on the plot.

( 3 ) IT is well settled that the question of Court-fee must be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by final decision of the suit on merits. This principle was laid down by the Supreme Court long back in Sathappa v. Ramanathan, AIR 1958 SC 245 and has been recently referred to by the Full Bench of this Court in Subhash Chand v. MPEB (2000) 3 MPLJ 522. The impugned order shows that the trial Judge was aware of this principle and that it has not applied it while deciding the dispute regarding payment of Court-fee. He has unnecessarily referred to the pleas of the defendant No. 1 in this respect. He has gone into the question whether the plaintiff is in "settled possession" of the land or not. As already stated, the allegation in the plaint is decisive for computation of Court-fee. The question of settled possession or unsettled possession is irrelevant.

( 4 ) THE case of the plaintiff is that he is in actual possession of the land and he is not the executant of the surrender deed dated 31-12-1999. In such a situation he is required to pay fixed Court-fee as per Art. 17 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) on the relief of declaration claimed by him. This point has been settled by the Full Bench of this Court in Santhosh v. Gyansunder 1970 MPLJ 363 where it was ruled that if the plaintiff is not bound by the decree, agreement or document he is not required to have it set aside and he can pay Court-fee under Art. 17 of Schedule II of the Act. In such case Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act is not attracted.

( 5 ) FOR claiming the relief of permanent injunction the Court-fee payable is as per Section 7 (iv) (d) of the Act. The plaintiff is at liberty to put his own valuation on such a relief of course, it should not be wholly unreasonable or arbitrary. This has been clarified in Raj Kaur v. Kinetic Gallery (2000) 2 MPLJ 72 that in cases falling within paragraph (iv) of Section 7, the plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation. The Court normally accepts the valuation put by the plaintiff if it is not too low or high. In the present case the plaintiff has valued the suit for the purpose of injunction under Section 7 (iv) (d) of the Act and that valuation is Rs. 20,000/ -. He has paid the Court-fee accordingly. The market value of the property is not the criterion for valuation under any of the clauses of Section 7 (iv) of the Act. It is the value of the relief sought that is the basis. The plaintiff has correctly valued the suit for injunction. This would also be the value for purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court for the relief of injunction as per Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. In Sabina v. Mohd. Abdul (1997) 1 MPLJ 554 it has been held that Section 7