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1998 Supreme(MP) 222

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
A. K. MATHUR, DEEPAK MISRA, S. K. KULSHRESTHA
ASHOK KUMAR - Appellant
Versus
BABOOLAL - Respondents
CIV. REVN. 708 Of 1995
Decided On : 03/05/1998

Advocates Appeared:
H.C.KOHLI, J.P.SANGHI, QUAMARUDDIN, R.L.SVARNAKAR, Ramesh Shrivastava, RAVISH CHANDRA AGARWAL, V.S.CHAUDHARY

The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred for the landlords defined in Section 23-J of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, if they do not want to avail the benefit of Chapter III-A of the Act.

Headnote:

LANDLORD AND TENANT - ACCOMMODATION CONTROL ACT - SECTION 11-A, 23-J, 45 - INTERPRETATION - LANDLORDS DEFINED IN SECTION 23-J - OPTION TO FILE SUIT BEFORE RENT CONTROLLING AUTHORITY OR CIVIL COURT - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT NOT BARRED.

Fact of the Case:

The issue before the court was whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred for the landlords defined in Section 23-J of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (the Act).

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred for the landlords defined in Section 23-J of the Act. The court interpreted Section 11-A of the Act to mean that the provisions of Chapter III of the Act (which deals with the control of eviction of tenants) will not apply to the landlords defined in Section 23-J under Chapter III-A (which deals with eviction of tenants on grounds of bona fide requirement). However, the court held that this does not mean that the landlords defined in Section 23-J cannot avail the remedy of the Civil Court if they do not want to avail the benefit of Chapter III-A.

Issues: Whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred for the landlords defined in Section 23-J of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred for the landlords defined in Section 23-J of the Act because: * Section 11-A of the Act only restricts the application of Chapter III of the Act (which deals with the control of eviction of tenants) to the landlords defined in Section 23-J under Chapter III-A (which deals with eviction of tenants on grounds of bona fide requirement). * This does not mean that the landlords defined in Section 23-J cannot avail the remedy of the Civil Court if they do not want to avail the benefit of Chapter III-A. * The forum created under Chapter III-A is for the benefit of the landlords defined in Section 23-J, and it does not exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court if the landlords so choose.

Final Decision: The court answered the reference accordingly and held that the view taken by the learned single Judge in Mahendra Kumar's case (AIR 1989 NOC 56) (Madh Pra) (supra) is no more a good law.

A. K. MATHUR, C. J.

( 1 ) THIS is a reference made by the learned single Judge on the ground that there is a conflict between the two Full Benches judgments; therefore, the matter should be referred to Larger Bench.

( 2 ) AT the very outset, we may mention that it is not correct to say that there is a conflict between the two Full (Sic) Benches judgments of this Court, i. e. in 1985 MPLJ 675 : (AIR 1986 Madh Pra 72), B. Johnson Bernard v. C. S. Naidu) and 1987 MPLJ 137 : (AIR 1987 Madh Pra 50), Praschand v. Hemant Kumar ). B. Johnson Bernard (supra) is a judgment by the Division Bench and Paraschand (supra) is a judgment given by the Full Bench. Therefore, it is wrong to say that there was a conflict between two Full (Sic) Benches decisions. In B. Johnson Beranard's case (supra), the Amending Act No. 27/83 and Act No. 7/85 were challenged being ultra vires of Articles 14 and 50 of the Constitution of India and their Lordships in, B. Johnson Bernard's case (supra), held that both the provisions are intra vires and not ultra vires to the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was observed in para 13 of the judgment as under:"p. 13:- Section 23-J specifies the categories of landlords, who alone are entitled to the benefit of Chapter III-A. These categories are retired servants of the Government or Defence Services; retired servants of Government owned or controlled companies; widow or a divorced wife; physicallyhandicapped person; or a servant of any Government or Defence Services, who is not entitled by his service condition to Government accommodation, on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to Government accommodation only on payment of penal rent. The test laid down by the Supreme Court in Ravi Sharma v. Ratanlal Bhargava, AIR 1984 SC 967 for permissible classification amongst the landlords for conferral of the benefit of the special procedure is fully satisfied by Section 23-J. These landlords specified in Section 23-J belong to a special category distinct from the remaining landlords, who deserve the benefit of the special procedure on account of their need being more pressing and the handicap from which they suffer as compared to the remaining landlords, the object of the amendment being to provide for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord. Confining this benefit only to these categories of the landlords specified in Section 23-J, on account of the greater handicap from which they suffer as compared to their landlords, after taking into account the misuse of the special procedure by certain landlords not falling in these categories, indicates a reasonable nexus of the classification with the object sought to be achieved by the Legislature. Following the Supreme Court decision in, Ravi Dutt Sharma's case, (AIR 1984 SC 967) (supra), the challenge to the classification of the landlords by enacting Section 23-J specifying certain categories of landlords only and simultaneously by Section 11-A confining the applicability of Chapter III-A to landlords defined in Section 23-J, is rejected. "our attention was also invited to Para 32 of, B. Johnson Bernard, (AIR 1986 Madh Pra 72) (supra), which reads as under:p. 32 :- The argument that option is given to the landlords defined in Section 23-J, to file proceedings on the grounds of bona fide personal need under Section 23-A before the Rent Controlling Authority and on the other grounds in the Civil Court, while other landlords have only to go to Civil Court, is difficult to appreciate. There is actually no option given to choose, there being only one forum for each ground for each category of landlord. It has already been shown that classification of the landlords is valid. No further consideration of this argument is necessary. In the case of, Praschand v. Hemant Kumar, 1987 MPLJ 137 : (AIR 1987 Madh Pra 50) (FB)), this was a Full Bench decision and in that, the question arose with regard to the effect










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