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1991 Supreme(MP) 61

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
T. N. SINGH, R. C. LAHOTI
UNION OF INDIA - Appellant
Versus
VIJAY SUNDARI - Respondents
MISC. APPEAL 29 Of 1986
Decided On : 02/08/1991

Advocates Appeared:
N.P.Mittal, S.C.JAIN

In case of death of a Government servant, the proper method of computation of compensation is to take into consideration the salary, allowances, and other benefits that the deceased would have received till his superannuation, reckoning promotions and increments in salary etc. during the course of his service.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1939 - SECTION 110-A, 110-B, 110-CC, 110-D - COMPENSATION FOR DEATH OF GOVERNMENT SERVANT - ASSESSMENT - METHOD - MULTIPLIER METHOD - FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED - ENHANCEMENT OF COMPENSATION - INTEREST - RATE.

Fact of the Case:

Deceased Rameshwardayal Bajpai, a Daftary in the Office of the Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh, at Gwalior, was hit by jeep No. CPH 13, belonging to the Border Security Force, Tekanpur. The accident took place on 3-10-1983 at around 1-30 p.m. and in an unconscious stage, the deceased was removed from the place of occurrence to the hospital where, on the same date, in the night, he breathed his last.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the vehicle was driven rashly and negligently and that the driver was negligent and did not care to look around and follow the Rule of the Road in that regard in order to discharge his duty to the pedestrians.

Issues: 1. Whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle? 2. Whether the claimants are entitled to compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939? 3. Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is adequate? 4. Whether the claimants are entitled to enhanced compensation?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the defence of inevitable accident was false and that the vehicle was driven rashly and negligently. 2. The court held that the claimants were entitled to compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 3. The court held that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal was inadequate. 4. The court held that the claimants were entitled to enhanced compensation.

Final Decision: The court modified the impugned award and held that the claimants were entitled to Rs. 1,15,000/- as compensation and interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of application till payment.

T. N. SINGH, J.

( 1 ) THE appeal and the cross-appeal are referred u/s, 110-D, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, the Act. In their appeal (M. A. No. 48 of 1986), the claimants have prayed for enhancement of the compensation, while in the other appeal (M. A. No. 29 of 1986), the prayer is for setting aside the award in toto.

( 2 ) DECEASED Rameshwardayal Bajpai, a Daftary in the Office of the Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh, at Gwalior, was, admittedly, hit by jeep No. CPH 13, belonging to the Border Security Force, Tekanpur. The accident took place on 3-10-1983 at around 1-30 p. m. and in an unconscious stage, the deceased was removed from place of occurrence to the hospital where, on the same date, in the night, he breathed his last. He was carried to hospital in the same vehicle which had caused the accident and the defence is that the vehicle was not driven rashly and negligently.

( 3 ) TWO questions mainly, evidently, arise for decision in these two appeals. We would examine first, therefore, the defence and evidence that has come on record in that regard. It appears that on three main props, the defence was erected, but in our view, claimants' case is proved allunde to sustain the finding and conclusion of the Tribunal that the vehicle was driven rashly and negligently at the time of the accident. False defence results evidently in dilution of the onus of the claimants. Indeed, when the case pleaded is that the Driver was not guilty of rash and negligent driving and interposition of human agency resulted in the inevitable accident, onus would lie on the driver to establish the stand taken. Because, when due to an act of God, any inevitable happens, the position is different. When it is not possible for a driver to prevent the accident by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill, it may be a case of an inevitable accident and it shall be open to him to plead that the cause of the accident was not absence of those, but of external human factor, such as the negligence of the victim.

( 4 ) IN the instant case, the defence alleged three specific facts as constituting the external human factor which resulted in the accident that the deceased was hit not by the front part of the vehicle, but by its rear part; that the deceased was negligent because he was running across the road to board a bus and he did not care to look around; and that there was' speed-breaker little ahead of the place of occurrence and, therefore, it had to be presumed that the vehicle was driven slowly. However, in evidence, those facts are not established and it can be justifiably held that false plea of the occurrence being an "inevitable accident" was set up. In the joint, written statement filed, it was specifically pleaded that there was a bus standing in front of A. G. 's Office and embarkation and disembarkation of passengers from that vehicle was going on. At that time the deceased, it is alleged, was running hurriedly across the road to board the bus and he did not look to his right to the on coming jeep and dashed against the middle portion of the jeep, being unable to stop himself. The driver immediately applied brakes and stopped the jeep. This plea, in evidence, was embellished and bolstered. O. 8, R. 2, CPC, contemplates that in regard to any "ground of defence", the defendant must state the necessary facts and S. 103, Evidence Act rests burden of proof of the facts so alleged on the defendant. Indeed, principles underlying these statutory provisions are of universal application to all civil litigations.

( 5 ) THE driver examined himself as D. W. 2 besides the Deputy Commandant of SAF, who deposed as D. W. 1 and stated that he was one of the occupants of the jeep at the time of accident. While D. W. 1 deposed that the deceased dashed against one side of the bonnet (front portion) of the jeep in the middle, D. W. 2 admitted in his cross-examination that he could not see when the deceased dashed against his vehicle. In his examinati









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