2003(1) BLJ 360
Deepak Verma and N.K. Jain, JJ.
Surajmal v. Sundarlal and others
Civil Revn. No. 866 of 1999; Decided on 31.3.2003.
The question referred for our decision is :
Whether the order passed in appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC deciding an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC one way or the other, can be challenged by taking recourse to revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of CPC ?
[Para 1
The moot question remains whether the order passed in appeal arising from an order granting or .refusing prayer for temporary injunction, is an interlocutory order made in the course of a suit or other proceedings. [Para 12
Held : An order disposing of an application for temporary injunction is one which is made pending the cause and before the final adjudication of that cause. The end sought to be secured by such an order is to maintain status quo with respect to subject matter of suit or proceeding. Any order passed on such an application may not have any connection with the final judgment as it is only collateral to the issues involved in the suit. In appeal filed under Order 43 R. 1 of CPC, what is decided only is the correctness or otherwise of the order passed by the trial Court without in any manner changing its basic character as an interim order. [Para 14
Power of revision though not taken away wholly, has been considerably limited by legislative enactments (amendments of 1976 and 1999) in the matter of revision of interlocutory orders made in the course of suit or proceeding and now this power cannot be exercised unless the order in revision is one if made in favour of petitioner would have finally disposed of the suit or proceeding. Needless to say that in the instant case this condition is not fulfilled. 1977 JLJ 312 (FB) relied on. 2002(2) JLJ 201 and 2003(2) JLJ 162 approved. 2002(11) MPJR 165 overruled. [Paras 17 & 18
(2) Interlocutory order -- means an order made provisionally in course of a suit or proceedings.
Generally speaking interlocutory order means an order made provisionally in the course of a suit or other proceedings. ... The term "interlocutory" in Law means not that which decides the cause, but that which only settles some intervening matter relating to the cause. ... An interlocutory order is one which is made pending the cause and before a final hearing on merits.
An interlocutory order is made to secure some end and purpose necessary and essential to the progress of the suit and generally collateral to the issues framed by the pleadings not connected with the final judgment. Law Lexicon by P. Ramatha Aiyar 1992 Edn. page 611 relied on. [Para 13
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fookfnr ç‘u ;g jgrk gS fd D;k vLFkk;h O;kns‘k ds fy, çkFkZuk eatwj vFkok ukeatwj djus ds vkns‘k ls mn~Hkwr vihy esa ikfjr vkns‘k okn vFkok vU; dk;Zokgh ds vuqØe esa fd;k x;k varorhZ vkns‘k gS\ ¿iSjk 12
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % vLFkk;h O;kns‘k ds fy, vkosnu dk fuiVkjk djus okyk vkns‘k ,slk vkns‘k gS tks okn&gsrqd ds yafcr jgrs rFkk ml gsrqd ds vafre vf/kfu.kZ;u ls iwoZ fd;k tkrk gSA ,sls vkns‘k }kjk ftl mn~ns‘; dh iwfrZ bZfIlr gS] og okn vFkok dk;Zokgh dh fo"k;&oLrq ds ckjs esa ;FkkfLFkfr cuk, j[kuk gSA ,sls vkosnu ij ikfjr fdlh Hkh vkns‘k dk] laHko gS] vafre fu.kZ; ls dksbZ laca/k ugha gks D;ksafd og okn esa varoZfyr fook|dksa ds dsoy lkaikf‘oZd gSA flfoy çfØ;k lafgrk ds vkns‘k 43 fu;e 1 ds v/khu Qkby dh xbZ vihy esa ftldk fofu‘p;u fd;k tkrk gS og fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns‘k dh dsoy ‘kq)rk vFkok vU;Fkk gS] varfje vkns‘k ds :i esa mldk vk/kkjHkwr pfj= fdlh Hkh çdkj ifjofrZr fd, fcukA ¿iSjk 14
okn vFkok dk;Zokgh ds vuqØe esa fd, x, varoZrhZ vkns‘kksa ds iqujh{k.k ds fo"k; esa fo/kk;h vf/kfu;fefr;ksa ¼lu~ 1976 rFkk 1999 ds la‘kks/ku½ }kjk iqujh{k.k dh ‘kfDr] ;|fi iw.kZr% Nhuh ugha xbZ gS] i;kZIrr% lhfer dj nh xbZ gS rFkk vc bl ‘kfDr dk ç;ksx rc rd ugha fd;k tk ldrk tc rd iqujh{k.k esa fd, x, vkns‘k ls] ;fn ;kph ds i{k esa fd;k x;k gks] okn vFkok dk;Zokgh dk vafre fuiVkjk ugha gksrk gksA ;g dguk vuko‘;d gS fd çLrqr ekeys esa bl ‘krZ dh iwfrZ ugha gksrhA 1977 ts ,y ts 312 ¼iw.kZ U;k;ihB½ voyafcrA 2002¼2½ ts ,y ts 201 rFkk 2003 ¼2½ ts ,y ts 162 vuqeksfnrA 2002¼2½ ,e ih ts vkj 165 myVk x;kA ¿iSjk 17 ,oa 18
¼2½ varorhZ vkns‘k&vFkZ gS okn vFkok dk;Zokgh ds vuqØe esa vuafre :i ls fd;k x;k vkns‘kA
lkekU;r% varorhZ vkns‘k dk vFkZ gS] okn vFkok vU; dk;Zokgh ds vuqØe esa vuafre :i ls fd;k x;k vkns‘kA----fof/k esa ^varoZrhZ* ‘‘kCn dk rkRi;Z mlls ugha gS ftlls okn&gsrqd fofuf‘pr gksrk gS] vfirq mlls gS ftlls okn&gsrqd ls lacaf/kr fdlh e/;orhZ fo"k; dk gh fuiVkjk gksrk gSA ----varorhZ vkns‘k og gS tks okn&gsrqd ds yafcr jgrs rFkk xq.kkxq.k ij vafre lquokbZ ls iwoZ fd;k tkrk gSA
varoZrhZ vkns‘k] okn dh çxfr ds fy, vko‘;d vkSj vfuok;Z fdlh mn~ns‘; vkSj ç;kstu dh iwfrZ ds fy, rFkk lkekU;r% vafre fu.kZ; ls vlaca) vfHkopuksa }kjk fojfpr fook|dksa ds lkaif‘oZd fd;k tkrk gSA jkeFkk v;;j Ñr yk yksfDldu] 1992 laLdj.k i`"B 611 voyafcrA ¿iSjk 13
Jain, J. -- 1. This Reference has been made to resolve the conflict between two sets of Single Bench decisions of this Court viz., Sawal Singh 2002(2) ILJ 201 = 2002(II) MPJR 169; Narsingh 2003(2) ILJ 162 = 2002(II).MPJR 165; and Hanuman Dutt 2002(4) MPLJ 354 on the point of tenability of revision against an order passed in appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arising from the order of the trial Court deciding application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code. The question referred for our decision is :
"Whether the order passed in appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC deciding an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC one way or the other, can be challenged by taking recourse to revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of CPC" ?
2. In Sawal Singh and Narsingh (supra), it is held that the order passed in appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC in which application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC was decided, cannot, on and after 1.7.2002 be challenged by taking recourse to revisional jurisdiction of this Court u/s 115. However, in Hanuman Daft (supra), contrary view has been expressed and it is held: "that the appeal in which appellate order is passed is covered by the word 'case' used in the opening part of sub-section (1) of S. 115. If there is jurisdictional error or infirmity of the kind specified in clauses (a) to (c) of this sub-section then a revision against such an appellate order would lie".
3. Since the question involved was of larger importance, we requested Senior Advocates of this Court Sarvashri S.D. Sanghi, G.M. Chilphekar, P.K. Saxena and B.L. Pavecha to address and assist the Court in resolving the issue. They all together with Sarvashri A.S. Kutumble, G.L. Verma and J.K. Joshi, learned counsel for the parties, addressed the Court. Mainly the arguments were advanced by the Senior Advocates while the others merely supported one line Or the other of the arguments.
4. Shri P.K. Saxena who opened the arguments contended that proceedings initiated on an application for temporary injunction fell within the per-view of 'Supplemental Proceedings' as envisaged u/s 94 of the Code. Any order on an application for temporary injunction would not amount to a step-in-aid to trial of the suit, submitted the counsel He also read out definitions of 'decree', 'order' and 'judgment' as given in section 2 of the Code to elaborate his arguments and submitted that any order passed in such a Supplemental Proceedings would not be an order passed in the course of a suit so as to attract the bar contained under the newly substituted proviso to section 115(1). The order passed in appeal in affirmance or otherwise of the order of the trial Court on such an application for temporary injunction, can, thus, be challenged by taking recourse to revisional jurisdiction of this Court, maintained the counsel.
5. Shri B.L. Pavecha also expressed the same view, but for different reasons. He submitted that an order passed in appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC is not an interlocutory order passed in the course of a suit of proceedings, but a final order terminating the appeal He contended that the dictum that an appeal is a continuation of a suit, is neither a rule of law nor a principle of universal application. Referring to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Bharat Chand (AIR 1978 MP 143), the learned senior counsel maintained that the appeal arising from an order passed in the suit deciding application for temporary injunction cannot be treated as a proceedings in continuation of the suit and any decision rendered in such appeal cannot be said to be an order passed in the course of a suit or other proceedings so as to attract the rigour of proviso to section 115(1). He cautioned that this proviso stands to limit the revisional power of the High Court and should be construed strictly. In support of his argument he quoted following passage from the Principles of Statutory inte
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