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2003 Supreme(MP) 331
2003(1) JLJ 410
(FULL BENCH)
Dipak Misra, S.P. Khare and A.K. Shrivastava, JJ.
Kowa Spinning Ltd. and others
Versus
Debt Recovery Tribunal and others
W.P. Nos. 5809, 5044 and 6362 of 2001; 412, 413, 414 and 705 of 2002; Decided on : 28.2.2003.
Kishore Shrivastava for petitioners;
Wajid Hyder and Rajesh Maindiretta for respondents.
Headnote:(1) Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 -- Ss. 20(1), 17(2) and 21 -- Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1994 -- Rr. 8 and 9 -- appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under S. 20(1) -- lies against any order which substantially affects some right or liabilities of the party -- it is not confined to final adjudication alone -- procedural rules will have to be followed.
The spinal issue spiraled to this Court when the writ petitions were instituted assailing the orders passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (in short ‘the Tribunal‘) on the foundation that Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (for short ‘the Appellate Tribunal‘) had already pronounced a verdict that against an interlocutory order passed under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, no appeal lies. The learned Single Judge. ... recommended for hearing of the matter by a larger Bench as provided under rule 9(1) occurring in Chapter-I of the M.P. High Court Rules and Orders. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Division Bench and the Division Bench considering the circumstances in entirety, felt that the question arising for consideration required to be considered and determined by a Full Bench. That is how this batch of writ petitions has come before us. [Para 1
Held: Section 17(2) uses the word "any order made" and section 20(1) uses the word "an order made". Though Mr. Shrivastava has made herculean endeavour to point out the difference between the terminology used in section 17 and section 20 on the backdrop that in one provision the word ‘an‘ is used and in another provision the word ‘any‘ is used. There is no difference between the two terms, namely ‘an‘ and ‘any‘. If the words used are understood in proper perspective taking into consideration the text and the context, we are of the considered view that the expressions used in section 17 and 20 are not repugnant to each other. In fact, they point out to a complete harmonious whole leading to a specific, precise, appropriate destination i.e. the tenability of appeal from an order or any order. [Para 17
Judged from all this angle, we are inclined to hold that an appeal lies against any order or an order which substantially affects some rights or liabilities of the party and is not confined to the final order alone. AIR 2000 Pat. 43, AIR 1997 Delhi 325 and 1999 ISJ Born. 309 relied on. AIR 1967 SC 799 followed. [Paras 17 & 19
(2) Debts Recovery Tribunal Regulations of Practice, 1988 -- Regs. 31 and 32 -- Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 -- R. 12(6) -- provisions under the regulations -- are intra vires the R. 12(6) of 1993 Rules and section 22 of the Act. 2001(1) MPLJ 400 confirmed. 2002 AIR SCW 1347 followed. [Para 24
(3) Constitution of India -- Arts. 32, 226 and 227 -- power of judicial review over legislative action vested in Supreme Court and High Court under -- is integral and essential feature of Constitution -- power of superintendence of High Court is also part of basic structure of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. ... We also hold that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This is because a situation where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that of constitutional interpretation, is equally to be avoided. 1997(1) MPLJ 621 (SC) 621 followed. [Para 26
(4) Constitution of India -- Arts. 226 and 227 -- alternative remedy -- not absolute bar to entertain writ petition under -- High Court in its discretion may, in suitable cases exercise extra ordinary power even if alternative remedy is available.
Where the order is on the face of it erroneous and raises question of jurisdiction, the High Court can indubitably entertain the writ petition. Thus, it is graphically clear that there is no bar for entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India where an alternative remedy has not been taken resort to. It is a self imposed restraint and restriction by the Court itself. While exercising such power under the Constitution the Court is required to keep in view certain factors. As has been noticed when an order is passed without jurisdiction or when principles of natural justice are violated or when the vires of an Act is challenged, or where enforcement of any of the fundamental right is sought or where a pure question of law arises or where a strong case has been made out, the Court may exercise the discretion. It is further noted that the Apex Court has also observed that the grounds are not exhaustive. No strait-jacket formula can be laid down. It will depend upon the facts of each case. AIR 1970 SC 645, AIR 1968 SC 98, AIR 1961 SC 1506, AIR 1977 SC 1132, AIR 1980 SC 1037 and AIR 1987 SC 286 followed. AIR 1979 Orri. 143, AIR 1988 Orri. 82 and 1974 I QB 720 relied on. [Paras 36 & 37
¼1½ cSadks vkSj foÙkh; laLFkkvksa dks ns; _.k dh olwyh vf/kfu;e] 1993 && /kkjk 20¼1½] 17¼2½ rFkk 21 && _.k olwyh vihy vf/kdj.k ¼izfØ;k½ fu;e] 1994 && fu- 8 rFkk 9 && /kkjk 20¼1½ ds v/khu vihy vf/kdj.k dks vihy && i{kdkj ds fdlh vf/kdkj dks lkjoku~ :i ls izHkkfor djus okys vkns‘k ds fo:) dh tk ldrh gS && og ek= vafre U;k;fu.kZ;u rd gh lhfer ugha gS && izfØ;kRed fu;eksa dk vuqlj.k djuk gksxkA
ewyHkwr iz‘u bl U;k;ky; ds le{k lfiZy xfr ls izLrqr gqvk tc _.k olwyh vf/kdj.k ds ml vkns‘k ij vk{ksi djrs gq, fjV ;kfpdk,¡ bl vk/kkj ij laLFkkfir dh xbZ fd _.k olwyh vihy vf/kdj.k }kjk igys&gh ;g vf/ker lquk fn;k x;k gS fd cSadksa vkSj foÙkh; laLFkkvksa dks ns; _.k dh olwyh vf/kfu;e] 1993 ds v/khu ikfjr varfje vkns‘k ds fo:) dksbZ vihy ugha gksxhA --- fo}ku ,dy U;k;k/kh‘k us ekeyk] e-iz- mPp U;k;ky; fu;e rFkk vkns‘k ds v/;k; 1 esa ;Fkk fo|eku fu;e 9¼1½ ds v/khu ;Fkk micaf/kr] c`gÙkj [kaM U;k;ihB }kjk lqus tkus dh flQkfj‘k dhA rRi‘pkr~ ekeyk [kaM U;k;ihB ds le{k j[kk x;k gS vkSj [kaM U;k;ihB us ifjfLFkfr;ksa ij laiw.kZrk ls fopj djrs gq, vuqHko fd;k fd fopkjkFkZ mn~Hkwr iz‘u iw.kZ U;k;ihB }kjk fopkj fd;k tkuk vkSj vo/kkfjr fd;k tkuk visf{kr gSA fjV ;kfpdkvksa dk ;g lewg bl Hkk¡fr gekjs le{k vk;k gSA ¿ iSjk 1
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % /kkjk 17¼2½ esa ‘‘kCn ^^fd;k x;k dksbZ vkns‘k** iz;qDr gq, gSa vkSj /kkjk 20¼1½ esa ^^fd;k x;k ¼,d½ vkns‘k**A ;|fi Jh JhokLro us /kkjk 17 vkSj 20 esa iz;qDr ikfjHkkf"kd ‘‘kCnkoyh ds chp varj] bl i`"BHkwfe ij ls funf‘kZr djus dk Hkhe iz;kl fd;k gS fd ,d mica/k esa ‘‘kCn ^,d* iz;qDr gqvk gS vkSj vU; esa ^dksbZ* iz;qDr gqvk gSA bu nksuksa ‘‘kCnksa vFkkZr~ ^,d* vkSj ^dksbZ* esa dksbZ varj ugha gSA ;fn ikB vkSj lanHkZ ij /;ku nsrs gq, iz;qDr ‘‘kCnksa dk vFkZ leqfpr ifjizs{; esa yxk;k tkrk gS] gekjh lqfopkfjr jk; gS fd /kkjk 17 vkSj 20 esa iz;qDr vfHkO;fDr;k¡ ijLij izfrdwy ugha gSA oLrqr%] muls fofufnZ"V] ;FkkZFkZ vkSj leqfpr y{; vFkkZr~ ¼,d½ vkns‘k vFkok fdlh vkns’k dh vihy pyus ;ksX; gksus ds ckjs esa fu%‘ks"k lqO;ofLFkr lkdY; ekxZ dk funsZ‘k gksrk gSA ¿ iSjk 17
bl dks.k ls fopkj djus ij ge vfHkfu/kkZfjr djuk pkgsaxs fd fdlh vkns‘k vFkok ¼,d½ vkns‘k ds fo:) vihy gksxh ftuls fdlh i{kdkj dk dksbZ vf/kdkj vFkok nkf;Ro izHkkfor gksrs gSa] og ,dek= vafre vkns‘k rd ds fy, lhfer ugha gSaA , vkb vkj 2000 iVuk 43] , vkb vkj 1997 fnYyh 325 rFkk 1999 vkb ,l ts cacbZ 309 voyafcrA , vkb vkj 1967 ,l lh 799 vuqlfjrA ¿ iSjk 17 ,oa 19
¼2½ _.k olwyh vf/kdj.k izfØ;k ds fofu;e] 1988 && fofu- 31 rFkk 32 && _.k olwyh vf/kdj.k ¼izfØ;k½ fu;e] 1993 && fu- 12¼6½ && fofu;eksa ds v/khu mica/k && 1993 ds fu;eksa dks fu;e 12¼6½ vkSj vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 22 ds ‘kDR;k/khu gSaA 2001¼1½ ,e ih ,y ts 400 iq"VA 2002 , vkb vkj ,l lh MCY;w 1347 vuqlfjrA ¿ iSjk 24
¼3½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku && vuq- 32] 226 rFkk 227 && ds v/khu mPpre U;k;ky; vkSj mPp U;k;ky; esa fufgr fo/kk;h dkjZokbZ ds U;kf;d iqufoZyksdu dh ‘kfDr && lafo/kku dk vaxHkwr vkSj eeZHkwr oSf‘k"V~; gS && mPp U;k;ky; dh v/kh{k.k ‘kfDr Hkh lafo/kku dh vk/kkjHkwr lajpuk dk Hkkx gSA
lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 226 ds v/khu mPp U;k;ky;ksa esa rFkk lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 32 ds v/khu bl U;k;ky; esa fufgr fo/kk;h dkjZokbZ ds U;kf;d iqufoZyksdu dh ‘kfDr] mldh vk/kkjHkwr lajpuk dk xBu djus okyk vaxHkwr vkSj eeZHkwr oSf‘k"V~; gSA blfy,] lkekU;r%] fo/kku dh lkafo/kkfud fof/kekU;rk dk ijh{k.k djus dh mPp U;k;ky;ksa vkSj mPpre U;k;ky; dh ‘kfDr dnkfi oafpr vFkok vioftZr ugha dh tk ldrhA ---- ge ;g Hkh vfHkfu/kkZfjr djrs gSa fd mudh viuh&viuh vf/kdkfjrk ds leLr U;k;ky;ksa vkSj vf/kdj.kksa ds fu.kZ;ksa ij U;kf;d v/kh{k.k iz;qDr djus dh fufgr ‘kfDr Hkh lafo/kku dh ewyHkwr lajpuk dk Hkkx gSA ,slk blfy, gS fd ,slh vofLFkfr leku :i ls ifjotZuh; gS tgk¡ lkafo/kkfud fuoZpu ds vfrfjDr] mPp U;k;ky;ksa dks vU; leLr U;kf;d d`R;ksa ls fufuZfgr gh tk,¡A 1997¼1½ ,e ih ,y ts 621 ¼,l lh½ 621 vuqlfjrA ¿ iSjk 26
¼4½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku && vuq- 226 rFkk 227 && oSdfYid mipkj && fjV ;kfpdk xzg.k fd, tkus ds fy, vkR;afrd otZu ugha gS && mPp U;k;ky; mi;qDr ekeyksa esa vius foosdkf/kdkj ls vlk/kkj.k ‘kfDr dk iz;ksx dj ldrk gS Hkys&gh oSdfYid mipkj miyC/k gksA
tgk¡ vkns‘k izR;{kr% xyr gks vkSj vf/kdkfjrk dk iz‘u mn~Hkwr gksrk gks] mPp U;k;ky; vlafnX/k :i ls fjV ;kfpdk xzg.k dj ldrk gSA vr% ;g ltho :i ls Li"V gS fd tgk¡ oSdfYid mipkj dk vkJ; ugha fy;k x;k gks] Hkkjr ds lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 226 vkSj 227 ds v/khu fjV ;kfpdk xzg.k fd, tkus dk otZu ugha gSA ;g U;k;ky; }kjk gh Lo;a ij vf/kjksfir vojks/k vkSj fucZa/ku gSA lafo/kku ds v/khu ,slh ‘kfDr iz;qDr djrs le; U;k;ky; dks dfri; dkjdksa dk /;ku djuk gksrk gSA tSlk vosf{kr fd;k x;k gS] tgk¡ dksbZ vkns‘k fcuk vf/kdkfjrk ds ikfjr fd;k x;k gS vFkok tgk¡ uSlfxZd U;k; ds fl)karksa dk mYya?ku fd;k x;k gS vFkok tgk¡ fdlh vf/kfu;e dh ‘kfDreÙkk dks pqukSrh nh xbZ gS] U;k;ky; foosdkf/kdkj dk iz;ksx dj ldrk gSA ;g vkSj Hkh vo/ks; gS fd f‘k[kj U;k;ky; us ;g Hkh leqfDr dh gS fd ;g vk/kk fu%‘ks"k ugha gSaA dksbZ iwoZ&fufeZr lw= vf/kdfFkr ugha fd;k tk ldrkA ;g izR;sd ekeys ds rF;ksa ij fuHkZj gksxkA , vkb vkj 1970 ,l lh 645] , vkb vkj 1968 ,l lh 98] , vkb vkj 1961 ,l lh 1506] , vkb vkj 1977 ,l lh 1132] , vkb vkj 1980 ,l lh 1037 rFkk , vkb vkj 1987 ,l lh 286 vuqlfjrA , vkb vkj 1979 mM+hlk 143] , vkb vkj 1988 mM+hlk 82 rFkk 1974 I D;w ch 720 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 36 ,oa 37
Misra, J. -- 1. In course of adjudication of proceedings in a Court of Law, sometimes vexed questions and complex situations do emerge which demand imperative penetration and intensive discernment to clear the maze and pave a luminous path through the labyrinthine so that the litigants precisely know their exact podium and become able to ventilate their grievances as permissible in law before the right forum without remaining in a state of uncertainty and indefiniteness. Certitude ushers in the quintessential virtues of law in an organized society and the absence of the same creates a shambolic situation which is not only unwarrantable but also law is at loath and averse to countenance the same. The cases at hand fresco a picture which not only creates a stir and an unusual ado to judicial discipline but also provokes and in a way accelerates the institutional syllogistic rethinking to have a deeper and greater probe into the arena of controversy. The spinal issue spiralled to this Court when the writ petitions were instituted assailing the orders passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (in short 'the Tribunal') on the foundation that Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (for short 'the Appellate Tribunal') had already pronounced a verdict that against an interlocutory order passed under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for brevity 'the Act'), no appeal lies. The learned Single Judge felt that a complex situation had surfaced inasmuch as this Court in the case of M/s Earnesh Health Care Limited and others v. Debts Recovery Tribunal and others, WP No, 4955/2000 placing reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of M/s Kavita Pigments and Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Allahabad Bank and others, AIR 2000 Patna 43, M/s Shoes East Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank AIR 1997 Delhi 325 and Bank of India v. Baroda Cables 1999 ISJ (Born) 309 had expressed the view that any order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal is appealable. In that background, the learned Single Judge in paragraph 5 of the order dated 31.1.2002 recommended for hearing of the matter by a larger Bench as provided under Rule 9(1) occurring in Chapter-I of the M.P. High Court Rules and Orders. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Division Bench and the Division Bench considering the circumstances in entirety, felt that the question arising for consideration required to be considered and determined by a Full Bench. That is how this batch of writ petitions has come before us.
2. Before we embark upon the legal issues that have been urged with vehemence, emphasis and eloquence by Shri Kishore Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners, we think it apposite to uncurtain the facts in Writ Petition No. 5809/2001. We may hasten to state that in course of our deliberation, we will briefly advert to the facts in other cases as we are required to finally dispose of the cases, reference having been made under Rule 9(1) of the M.P. High Court Rules and Orders. The factual score as depicted in the writ petition is that the respondent No.2, State Bank of Indore, instituted a proceeding for recovery against the petitioners and the respondent No.3. After filing of the original application, the Debts Recovery Tribunal (in short 'the Tribunal') instead of issuing notices to the respondents therein for filing of reply on merits received evidence on behalf of the Bank and only after such receipt the Tribunal directed issuance of notices to the defendants. The petitioners appeared on the date of appearance i.e. 20.11.2000 and filed their reply. In their written statement/reply, the petitioners did not admit the claim put forth by the Bank and raised serious disputes with regard to the facts alleged in the petition filed by the Bank. As the Tribunal had received evidence on affidavits, the petitioners filed an application under proviso to sub-rule 6 of Rule 12 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal Procedure Rules, 1993 (in short 'the Rules') t
