Dr. T.N. Singh, J. -- 1. Two petitioners were heard analogously for two-reasons: one, our competence to hear both petitions at Gwalior Bench was challenged; two, both petitioners have challenged (on different grounds though) the same action of Public Service Commission refusing to call them for interview for the post of Civil Judge. This order shall accordingly govern disposal of both matters, namely, Misc. Petition No. 1185 of 1989 and Misc. Petition No. 1464 of 1989 (Omprakash Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others).

2. We set out below the order dated 22.4.1981, passed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice as that is the source of challenge to our competence to hear the petitions:

"In accordance with orders of my predecessor dated 5.2.1976, issued under the proviso to notification No. 1620/68=Judl. III, dated November 28, 1968, issued by the President under section 51(2) of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 (No. 36 of 1956) and in supersession of my orders dated 6.1.1981, I hereby order that all cases relating to selection and/or appointment of Judicial Officers; and all cases instituted by or against Judicial Officers or Ex-judicial Officers of Madhya Pradesh relating to termination of service or any other service matter shall be heard at Jabalpur.

This order shall also apply to pending case."

3. Although strong reliance was placed on two Full Bench decisions of this Court, for reasons to follow, we regard that exercise to be misconceived. The decisions cited axe: Abdul Taiyab Bhai and Five others v. Union of India and Five others (1976 JLJ 706); Balkrishan Das v. Hamarain (1979 JLJ 745).

4. In Abdul Taiyab Bhai (supra), the Court was required to address itself mainly to the scope of the power of the President and of the Chief Justice envisaged under section 51(2) of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956, for short, S.R. Act. Indeed, the vires of the provision was agitated and the challenge was negatived. It is true that some discussion can be read in the two separate judgments in that case on the purport and import of the expression "in respect of cases arising in" used in the Presidential Order dated 28.11.1968 passed under section 52, but that exercise was evidently inhibited by Apex Court's view expressed in kindered circumstances in regard to that expression in Nasiruddin's case (AIR 1976 SC 331). In Balkrishan Das (supra), the scope of two orders passed on same date, 5.2.1976, by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, deriving authority from the same Presidential Order, was required to be determined. In that case, the Court found it necessary to determine the meaning to be attached to the words 'hearing' and 'determine' used in those orders as the question posed was whether writ petition which raised question of vires of any enactment, rule or notification had to be listed even for admission and interim order at Jabalpur and the Indore and Gwalior Benches had no jurisdiction to deal with those matters.

5. In the instant case, we are required to construe a different order, albeit passed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice in virtue of the same Presidential Order. We are required, in our view, to construe the order extracted aforesaid on its own term and language and that indeed, in the perspective of constitutional imperatives. The question that precisely arises for our determination in this case is what meaning is to be attributed to the clause "cases relating to selection" in its context and setting in the order afore extracted. On behalf of the petitioners, it has been urged that the phraselogy needs careful examination and proper meaning is to be attributed mainly to the words 'cases' and 'selection'. It is also urged that the meaning should accord with constitutional imperatives and the order be so construed as to maintain its constitutionality. The object of the order, it has been further urged, must be kept in view as that can be regarded as the most reliable guide for devising the meaning of the crucial words.

6.